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COORDINATING COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES
Veronica Roott
In today's regulatory environment, a corporation engaged
in wrongdoing can be sure of one thing: regulators will point to
an ineffective compliance program as a key cause of institu-
tional misconduct. The explosion in the importance of compli-
ance is unsurprising given the emphasis that governmental
actors-from the Department of Justice, to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, to even the Commerce Department-
place on the need for institutions to adopt "effective compli-
ance programs." The governmental actors that demand effec-
tive compliance programs, however, have narrow scopes of
authority. DOJ Fraud handles violations of the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act, while the SEC adjudicates claims of mis-
conduct under the securities laws, and the Federal Trade
Commission deals with concerns regarding anticompetitive be-
havior. This segmentation of enforcement authority has cre-
ated an information and coordination problem amongst
regulators, resulting in an enforcement regime where institu-
tional misconduct is adjudicated in a piecemeal fashion. En-
forcement actions focus on compliance with a particular set of
laws instead of on whether the corporate wrongdoing is a
result of a systematic compliance failure that requires a com-
prehensive, firm-wide, compliance overhaul. As a result, the
government's goal of incentivizing companies to implement "ef-
fective ethics and compliance programs" appears at odds with
its current enforcement approach.
Yet governmental actors currently have the tools neces-
sary to provide strong inducements for corporations to, when
needed, engage in restructuring of their compliance programs.
t E Veronica Root, Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
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This Article argues that efforts to improve corporate compli-
ance would benefit from regulatory mechanisms that
(i) recognize when an institution is engaged in recidivist be-
havior across diverse regulatory areas and (ii) aggressively
sanction institutions that are repeat offenders. If governmen-
tal actors adopt a new enforcement strategy aimed at "Coordi-
nating Compliance Incentives," they can more easily detect
when an institution is suffering from a systemic compliance
failure, which may deter firms from engaging in recidivist be-
havior. If corporations are held responsible for being repeat
offenders across diverse regulatory areas, it may encourage
them to implement more robust reforms to their compliance
programs and, ultimately, lead to improved ethical conduct
and more effective compliance programs within public
companies.
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INTRODUCTION
Compliance is king, and its subjects-regulators, prosecu-
tors, courts, corporations, and academics-are quick to tout its
power and potential for good. In 2015, the Director of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Enforcement Divi-
sion stated, "strong legal and compliance functions are critical
elements of any successful enterprise, particularly those oper-
ating in the securities industry... . When legal and compliance
departments are not treated as full partners in the business,
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regulatory problems are inevitable."' In 2014, the Assistant
Attorney General for the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Crimi-
nal Division explained that the work of compliance officials
"serves to protect the integrity of our public markets, the coun-
try's financial systems, our intellectual property, the retire-
ment accounts of our hardworking citizens, and our taxpayer
dollars."2 In 2012, "36 percent of organizations sentenced had
ajudge order" the adoption of a compliance program, compared
to only 6 percent in 2008.3 And these strong signals, and
others like them, have led corporations to focus on strengthen-
ing their internal compliance programs.4 For example, in
2014, the President and CEO of Walmart Stores, in the midst of
weathering a stunning bribery scandal, discussed the com-
pany's goal "to become the model of excellence in global compli-
ance and ethics."5 Additionally, the President and CEO of
Walmart International stated that "[als a global company, we
have responsibilities to the countries in which we operate. We
earn trust through our commitment to compliance."6 These
are just a few of numerous examples that demonstrate an un-
abashed fidelity to compliance efforts within the current legal
and regulatory environment.
Yet corporate misconduct continues, and many corpora-
tions suffer from multiple compliance failures within relatively
short time periods. An example of an institution with repeated
I Andrew Ceresney, Dir. of Enft, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at
SIFMA's 2015 Anti-Money Laundering & Financial Crimes Conference (Feb. 25,
2015) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/022515-
spchc.html [https://perma.cc/5L7X-4RWU]) (including a disclaimer that his re-
marks expressed his own view and did not reflect the views of the SEC or its staff).
2 Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney Gen. for the Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Remarks at the 22nd Annual Ethics and Compliance Conference (Oct.
1, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-as
sistant-attorney-general-criminal-division-leslie-r-caldwell-22nd-annual-ethics
Ihttps://perma.cc/KM8F-97XY]) [hereinafter Caldwell, Remarks at Ethics and
Compliance].
3 BRANDON L. GARRETT, Too BIG TO JAIL: How PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS 164 (2014).
4 See, e.g., MATr KELLY ET AL., DELOITTE , IN FOCUS: 2015 COMPLIANCE TRENDS
SURVEY 8 (2015) ("U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (plus a host of other enforcement
actions, consent decrees, and regulatory statements) clearly favor a strong, inde-
pendent corporate compliance function.... The 2015 Compliance Trends Survey
report suggests that more and more organizations are moving in that
direction .... ).
5 Walmart Stores' CEO Discusses F4Q 2014 Results - Earnings Call Tran-
script, YAHOO! FIN. (Feb. 20, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/
walmart-stores-ceo-discusses-f4q-140113595.html [https://perma.cc/C3RD-
7PWA].
6 Q4 2014 WalMart Stores, Inc. Prerecorded Earnings Conference Call -
Final, FAIR DISCLOSURE WIRE, Feb. 20, 2014, GALE, Doc. No. A360716228.
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instances of misconduct is HSBC Group (HSBC), a large, mul-
tinational financial services company with around thirty-seven
million customers in seventy countries and territories. 7 Each
year, for the past six years, a governmental body has deter-
mined that HSBC, through one of its subsidiaries, has engaged
in some type of regulatory or legal misconduct.
* In 2010, HSBC North America Holdings, Inc. (HSBC NA)
and the Federal Reserve Board (Federal Reserve) entered
into a consent Cease and Desist Order requiring HSBC NA
to improve its firm-wide compliance risk-management
program with a specific emphasis on its anti-money laun-
dering efforts.8
* Also in 2010, HSBC Securities (USA) settled charges
brought by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
for failing to adequately disclose the risks associated with
auction rate securities to customers.9
* In 2011, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the conser-
vator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, sued HSBC NA for
violations of the securities laws in connection with pri-
vate-label mortgage-backed securities purchased by Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac during 2005-2007. In 2014,
HSBC settled these claims for $550 million. 10
* In 2012, HSBC Holdings PLC (HSBC Holdings) and HSBC
Bank USA, N.A. (HSBC USA) entered into an agreement
with the DOJ and admitted to violating the U.S. Bank
Secrecy Act, the International Emergency Economic Pow-
ers Act, and the Trading with the Enemy Act.11 As part of
its settlement agreement with the DOJ, HSBC Holdings
and HSBC USA agreed to retain a corporate compliance
7 Structure and Network, HSBC, http://www.hsbc.com/about-hsbc/struc-
ture-and-network [https://perma.cc/FMC4-SQ2M] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
HSBC has four major business areas: Commercial Banking, Global Banking and
Markets, Global Private Banking, and Retail Banking and Wealth Management.
Id.
8 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20101007a.htm
[https://perma.cc/F7GP-35RG].
9 News Release, FINRA, FINRA Fines HSBC Securities (USA) $1.5 million, US
Bancorp $275,000 for Auction Rate Securities Violations (Apr. 22, 2010), http://
www.finra.org/newsroom/20 10/finra-fines-hsbc-securities-usa- 15-million-us-
bancorp-275000-auction-rate-securities [https://perma.cc/228E-BYL3].
10 News Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Announces Settlement with
HSBC (Sept, 12, 2014), http://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-
Announces-Settlement-with-HSBC.aspx [https://perma.cc/G722-BMWX.
11 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank
USA N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit
$1.256 Billion in Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012), http://
wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-
money-laundering-and-sanctions-violations [https://perma.cc/X8CF-Y8WF].
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monitor for a five-year period. 1 2 The U.S. Department of
the Treasury Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and
the U.S. Federal Reserve Board were also involved in in-
vestigating the HSBC entities' unlawful activity.1 3 In
2015, the monitor indicated that while HSBC Holdings
has improved its compliance in some areas, its corporate
culture and compliance technology still do not meet the
requirements of the deferred prosecution agreement the
bank agreed to as part of a 2012 settlement.1 4
* Also in 2012, a United States Senate Permanent Subcom-
mittee on Investigations case study determined that HSBC
USA repeatedly failed to detect international money laun-
dering, connections to terrorist financing, and violations
of U.S. economic and trade sanctions.15
* In 2013, HSBC USA, N.A. self-reported three apparent
violations of the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations
to the Office of Foreign Asset Control and agreed to remit
$32,400 as part of its settlement with Office of Foreign
Asset Control.1 6
* Also in 2013, HSBC entered into an agreement with the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal
Reserve to settle allegations that it engaged in mortgage
foreclosure abuse.17
12 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 15-17, United States v. HSBC Bank
USA, N.A., No. 12-763 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2012), ECF No. 3-2, http://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012/12/11 /dpa-executed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3C3N-MEYR].
13 News Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Assesses
$500 Million Civil Money Penalty Against HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (Dec. 11, 2012),
http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2012/nr-occ-2012-
173.html [https://perma.cc/WAZ5-5GAJ}; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys. (Dec. 11, 2012) https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/enforcement/2012121 lb.htm [https://perma.cc/XL7L-BP7Z].
14 Letter from Loretta Lynch et al., U.S. Attorney, to the Hon. John Gleeson,
Justice for the U.S. Dist. Court, E. Dist. of N.Y. at 2, United States v. HSBC Bank
USA, N.A., No. 12-763 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2015), ECF No. 33.
15 S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., U.S. VULNERABILI-
TIES TO MONEY LAUNDERING, DRUGS, AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HSBC CASE HISTORY 10
(2012), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=2a76c00f-7c3a-44c8-902e-
3d9b5dbd0083 [https://perma.cc/DSC7-XC4Y].
16 HSBC Bank USA, N.A. Settles Potential Civil Liability for Apparent Violations
of the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, OFF. FOREIGN ASSET CONTROL: EN-
FORCEMENT INFO. (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20131217_hsbc.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7NN-
LF28].
17 News Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC and Federal
Reserve Reach Agreement with HSBC to Provide $249 Million in Payments and
Assistance (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/
2013/nr-ia-2013-13.html [https://perma.cc/Y6Y9-GMLGI.
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* In 2014, HSBC entered into a settlement with the U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission for charges re-
lated to manipulation of the foreign exchange market.1 8
* Also in 2014, HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) S.A. (HSBC
Suisse) settled charges related to its willfully providing
"unregistered broker-dealer and investment advisory ser-
vices to U.S. clients" in violation of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of
1940.19
* In 2015, HSBC Suisse was placed under investigation for
potentially assisting its clients with tax evasion in the
U.S., France, and other countries. 2 0
* In 2016, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
assessed a $35 million penalty against HSBC Bank USA,
N.A. for violating Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act due to improper billing of customers for a credit-
monitoring product marketed and sold by the bank and
its affiliate. 2 1
Thus, HSBC is a complex organization that has repeatedly en-
gaged in actions that violate statutory or regulatory require-
ments. HSBC has not, however, been labelled a repeat offender
or recidivist by any governmental or regulatory authorities. Im-
portantly, HSBC's history of compliance failures is neither re-
markable nor unique. 22 Many other corporate entities have
similarly long lists evidencing noncompliance with legal and
18 Press Release, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n, CFTC Orders
Five Banks to Pay over $1.4 Billion in Penalties for Attempted Manipulation of
Foreign Exchange Benchmark Rates (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/Press
Room/PressReleases/pr7056-14 [https://perma.cc/UQW8-DCP7].
19 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges HSBC's Swiss
Private Banking Unit with Providing Unregistered Services to U.S. Clients (Nov. 25,
2014), http: / /www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/ 13705
43534789#.VQhOXkKprzI [https://perma.cc/H3E4-JV75].
20 John Letzing, HSBC Hit by Fresh Details of Tax Evasion Claims, WALL
STREET J. (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hsbc-hit-by-fresh-details-
of-tax-evasion-claims-1423482612 [https://perma.cc/CPC2-SZHG]; see also
Martha M. Hamilton et al., New Countries Seek HSBC Data and Undeclared Cash,
INr'L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Feb. 23, 2015, 6:30 AM), http://
www.icij.org/project/swiss-leaks/new-countries-seek-hsbc-data-and-undecla
red-cash [https://perma.cc/D3K4-D6BJI.
21 News Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Assesses $35
Million Penalty Against HSBC Bank USA, N.A.; Orders Restitution to Customers
for Unfair Billing Practices (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.occ.gov/news-issu-
ances/news-releases/2016/nr-occ-2016-45.html [https://perma.cc/7QW8-D9
WT].
22 See, e.g., Corporate Rap Sheets, CORP. RES. PROJECT, http://corp-re-
search.org/corporaterapsheets [https://perma.cc/6YYV-W8C4] (linking to dos-
siers on several companies' compliance failures).
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regulatory requirements across a variety of legal areas. 23 All
this leads to the question: Why has the government largely
failed to sanction corporate repeat offenders as recidivists?
Part I discusses the piecemeal origins of corporate compli-
ance programs-various regulatory and statutory require-
ments, paired with the government's enforcement structure, as
well as pressure from private parties. Part II systematically
looks at the treatment of corporations entering into repeated
settlement agreements over time through a case study of DOJ
Fraud enforcement actions. The case study demonstrates that
corporations that engage in misconduct that is similar in un-
derlying purpose and behavior are not treated as repeat offend-
ers when sanctioned by distinct governmental agents but are
treated as repeat offenders when before the same enforcement
authority on multiple occasions.
Part III suggests that information, coordination, and lack of
identified responsibility challenges may partially explain the
findings of the case study. It then puts forth the thesis of this
Article-efforts to improve incentives to create effective corpo-
rate compliance programs would benefit from regulatory mech-
anisms that (i) recognize when an institution is engaged in
recidivist behavior across diverse regulatory areas and
(ii) aggressively sanction institutions that are repeat offenders.
In short, governmental actors would benefit from more coordi-
nated enforcement efforts aimed at sanctioning recidivist con-
duct, which in turn would increase incentives for private firms
to engage in systematic revisions to their compliance programs.
Part III then outlines a proposal for reform, which provides a
framework for detecting recidivist public corporations through
their current reporting obligations to the SEC and a structural
mechanism for coordinating governmental efforts to incentivize
private firms to implement more robust compliance programs.
Part IV discusses benefits of and objections to the Article's
proposal and then addresses some unresolved concerns raised
by the case study and proposal.
23 See, e.g., GARRmr, supra note 3, at 166 ("It is not at all clear that prosecu-
tors take corporate recidivism seriously. Some settlements reflect prior crimes,
but often they do not appear to do so. Companies with several environmental
convictions include BP, ExxonMobil (with four convictions since 2001), McWane
Inc., and a series of ocean shipping companies.").
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I
A REGIME OF PIECEMEAL COMPLIANCE
A focus on compliance within corporations has increased
exponentially over the past two decades, and it appears poised
to continue to grow in importance.24 Regulators, prosecutors,
and industry insiders have all bought into the idea that estab-
lishing and maintaining an effective compliance program is key
to ensuring corporations adhere to increasingly complex legal
and regulatory requirements. 25
As this Part will demonstrate, the origins of compliance
programs are a natural consequence of a number of circum-
stances. Statutory and regulatory mandates require firms
within certain industries to develop compliance programs. Ad-
ditionally, prosecutors provide concrete incentives for private
firms to create effective compliance programs because a pro-
gram's existence can serve as a defense or mitigating factor to
actual or potential criminal prosecution. Moreover, incentives
created by governmental enforcement priorities encourage cor-
porations to pressure their own private business partners to
adhere to certain compliance standards.
A. Piecemeal Statutory & Regulatory Dictates
Perhaps it is unsurprising that today's compliance regime
has been undertaken in a piecemeal fashion when one consid-
ers the various statutory and regulatory dictates that have led
to many corporate compliance priorities. There is no formal
statute or regulation that requires firms to engage in compre-
hensive compliance efforts. Instead, there are specific statu-
tory and regulatory admonishments that require firms within
certain industries to implement discrete compliance programs.
For example, the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 requires banks
to adopt an anti-money laundering program. 26 Specifically, it
requires banks to (i) develop internal policies, procedures, and
24 See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance,
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2077 (2016) ("Over the past decade, compliance has
blossomed into a thriving industry, and the compliance department has emerged,
in many firms, as the co-equal of the legal department.").
25 See, e.g., Ceresney, supra note 1 ("Today more than ever, given the vastly
increased financial regulatory structure, legal and compliance must be gatekeep-
ers in ensuring conformance with the law.").
26 See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Effective Compliance Pro-
grams 3 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-39,
2014) [hereinafter Miller, Economic Analysis] (citing Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C.
§ 5318(h)(1) (2012)), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
2533661.
1010 [Vol. 102:1003
2017] COORDINATING COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES
controls; 2 7 (ii) designate a compliance officer to oversee the
bank's efforts; 28 (iii) provide training to employees on an ongo-
ing basis in an effort to prevent money laundering; 29 and
(iv) implement an independent audit function to test the effec-
tiveness of the bank's programs.3 0 Thus, in as early as the
1970s, actions were taken in an effort to mandate that private
firms engage in effective policing efforts; those efforts have con-
tinued to grow.31
In 2002, in response to the Enron and Arthur Andersen
scandals, 32 Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which
was described by former President George W. Bush as "the
most far reaching reforms of American business practices since
the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt." 3 3  Sarbanes-Oxley
"mandated a number of reforms to enhance corporate respon-
sibility" as well as "enhance[d] financial disclosures and com-
bat[ted] corporate and accounting fraud."3 4  Specifically, it
emphasized the importance of "internal compliance and en-
hanced internal corporate controls [and] . . . effectively forced
corporate gatekeepers to 'commit' to corporate compliance."35
As such, Sarbanes-Oxley and corresponding regulatory re-
forms increased the emphasis on compliance within private
firms. "More than a decade following the enactment of
Sarbanes-Oxley, both 'compliance' and 'risk management' have
become key functions within public corporations." 3 6 Today, it
is very uncommon for regulators to encounter public compa-
nies that "do not have any compliance program."3 7
27 See id. at 3-4.
28 See 12 C.F.R. § 326.8(c)(2) (2016) (clarifying the purpose of compliance
officers).
29 See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (explaining that the purpose of the statute is to
"guard against money laundering").
30 See Miller, Economic Analysis, supra note 26, at 4.
31 See Miriam H. Baer, Confronting the 7vo Faces of Corporate Fraud, 66 FIA.
L. REv. 87, 143 (2014).
32 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Gov-
ernance: An Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FIA. L. REV. 1,
16-18 (2014); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Compliance Function: An Overview 3 (N.Y.U.
Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-36, 2014), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=252762 1 [hereinafter Miller,
Compliance Function].
33 The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S SEC. & EXCHANGE COM-
MISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#sox2002 Ihttps://perma.cc/
4LPJ-WVVC] (last modified Oct. 1, 2013).
34 Id.
35 Baer, supra note 31, at 141-42 (citing Manuel A. Utset, Time-Inconsistent
Management & the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 417, 442 (2005)).
36 Id. at 143.
37 Caldwell, Remarks at Ethics and Compliance, supra note 2.
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More recently, in response to the financial crisis of 2007-
2009, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, which
included a requirement that regulators overseeing banks im-
plement the "Volcker Rule."38 The Volcker Rule regulations
prohibit banks from engaging in proprietary trading and re-
strict commercial banks and their affiliates from investing in
hedge funds and private equity firms.3 9 The regulations detail
the necessary "components of an effective compliance pro-
gram"4 0 and require mid-sized banks to adhere to the "follow-
ing six elements: written policies and procedures; a system of
internal controls; a management framework that clearly deline-
ates responsibility and accountability for compliance; indepen-
dent testing and audit of the effectiveness of the compliance
program; training for trading personnel and managers; and
making and keeping records sufficient to demonstrate compli-
ance." 4 1 Additionally, the Volcker Rule requires that Chief Ex-
ecutive Officers (CEO) at companies subject to the rule "attest
that the company's compliance program is reasonably de-
signed to achieve compliance with [the rule.]"4 2
These are just a few of what are many different statutory or
regulatory frameworks that require corporations to engage in
specific compliance efforts.4 3 The manner in which these dif-
ferent requirements came into being makes sense intuitively.
As Congress or regulators encountered areas of corporate mis-
conduct, they responded by requiring organizations to imple-
ment reforms targeted at improving policing within firms and
compliance with specific legal and regulatory mandates. As
these various requirements were enacted, private firms then
created or modified existing compliance programs, on a piece-
meal basis, so that their programs would adhere to the regula-
tory changes.
38 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620-31 (2010); Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Haz-
ardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged) Risks of Hedging with Credit Derivatives,
33 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 813, 822 (2014).
39 See 17 C.F.R. pt. 75 (2016); Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary
Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Pri-
vate Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5808, 5810 (Jan. 31, 2014).
40 Miller, Economic Analysis, supra note 26, at 6.
41 Miller, Compliance Function, supra note 32, at 13.
42 12 C.F.R. pt. 248, app. B.
43 See generally Miller, Economic Analysis, supra note 26, at 3 (citing U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016) (noting
that effective compliance programs may deter prosecution or lower sanctions); see
also Baer, supra note 31, at 142 (discussing prosecution agreements and reduced
criminal sanctions).
10 12 [Vol. 102:1003
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B. Diverse, Enforcement-Related Incentives
A number of enforcement-related policies and practices
have also resulted in changes to corporate compliance pro-
grams. Governmental actors adopt certain enforcement strate-
gies in an effort to leverage companies' strong interests in
avoiding sanctions for failing to comply with legal and regula-
tory requirements. The government is able to encourage pri-
vate firms to engage in aggressive self-policing efforts by
providing leniency to corporations who, though engaged in
misconduct, nevertheless have "effective compliance pro-
grams,"44 and by ramping up sanctions for companies who
failed to ensure that their agents comply with the law. 4 5
The framework empowering the government's enforce-
ment-related incentives comes primarily through the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission's Organizational Guidelines. Twenty-six
years ago, in 1991, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were
promulgated, and, in a section entitled "Effective Compliance
and Ethics Program," organizations were admonished to "exer-
cise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct;
and . . otherwise promote an organizational culture that en-
courages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance
with the law."4 6 The Organizational Guidelines, pursuant to
requirements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, were revised in 2004
"to further define the meaning of an effective compliance and
ethics program."4 7
Today, the Organizational Guidelines outline "seven key
criteria for establishing an 'effective compliance program.' 4 8
* Oversight by high-level personnel;
* Due Care in delegating substantial discretionary
authority;
44 In addition to these types of governmental frameworks, there are also self-
regulatory organizations that are utilized to "implement rules that prevent" orga-
nizational misconduct. See Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, 102
IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 41-42), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2776731.
45 See Caldwell, Remarks at Ethics and Compliance, supra note 2 (discussing
that a corporation that engaged in "massive disregard for compliance," was prose-
cuted, eventually pleaded guilty, and was ultimately required to pay a record $8.8
billion penalty).
46 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
1991).
47 Baer, supra note 31, at 142 (internal quotation marks omitted).
48 PAULA DESIO, DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AN OVER-
VIEW OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/
pdf/training/organizational-guidelines/ORGOVERVIEW.pdf ihttps://perma.cc/
HF99-W8ZY] [hereinafter DESIO, OVERVIEW).
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* Effective Communication to all levels of employees;
* Reasonable steps to achieve compliance, which include
systems for monitoring, auditing, and reporting suspected
wrongdoing without fear of reprisal;
* Consistent enforcement of compliance standards includ-
ing disciplinary mechanisms; and
* Reasonable steps to respond to and prevent further simi-
lar offenses upon detection of a violation.4 9
These guidelines, if followed, provide concrete suggestions for
corporations developing comprehensive compliance programs.
Because of the different business realities that individual cor-
porations face, the guidelines provide broad-based require-
ments that businesses can implement in a manner that makes
the most sense for their particular business risks.
Since companies have different characteristics, history, and
cultures, any attempt to specify the ingredients of an effective
program at a granular level will likely generate poor results.
No regulator or prosecutor can hope to know more about the
internal workings of an organization than the existing man-
agers who spend their professional lives there.5 0
Thus, the Organizational Guidelines as currently written are
generally considered a strong source of guidance for corpora-
tions interested in developing, on their own initiative, an effec-
tive compliance program.5 1
There is, however, a limitation within the overarching
framework of the Organizational Guidelines that encourages
piecemeal compliance: they are invoked formally only when a
prosecution is contemplated against a corporation engaged in
misconduct, and prosecutions are often focused on a narrow
aspect of misconduct. Prosecutors often "demand that targets
upgrade compliance programs as a condition to deferred prose-
cution or non-prosecution agreements," and "[s]ettlements of
regulatory enforcement actions often include undertakings to
enhance compliance activities." 52 These enforcement-related
incentives, however, do not typically encourage corporations to
engage in comprehensive modifications to their compliance
programs; instead, the focus is on a particular aspect of a
49 Id.
50 Miller, Economic Analysis, supra note 26, at 19.
51 See Miller, Compliance Function, supra note 32, at 12 (noting that the
Sentencing Guidelines may have been "the earliest statement of the requirements
for a robust compliance program"). But see GARRETr, supWa note 3, at 160 (noting
that because the guidelines "do not give meaningful credit for good corporate
conduct. . . law professor Jennifer Arlen has called the guidelines a 'failure."').
52 Miller, Compliance Function, supra note 32, at 11.
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firm's compliance program.53 Thus, while the compliance
framework contemplated in the guidelines is quite broad, the
actual enforcement mechanisms that lead to the invocation of
the goals within the Organizational Guidelines are often quite
narrow. Additionally, the Organizational Guidelines often
serve in a purely advisory capacity, as they technically do not
govern or restrict behavior associated with civil enforcement
actions.54
For example, the Fraud Section at the DOJ (DOJ Fraud) is
responsible for bringing prosecutions against corporations for
violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).55 In the
past decade, DOJ Fraud has employed a relatively aggressive
enforcement strategy aimed at discouraging improper pay-
ments to foreign officials.56 Many potential FCPA prosecutions,
however, result in civil settlement agreements in the form of
deferred or non-prosecution agreements, thereby making the
Organizational Guidelines technically inapplicable. These civil
settlement agreements often include a provision discussing the
corporation's compliance program, but the discussion is often
focused on the corporation's compliance with a specific legal
area. For instance, in a deferred prosecution agreement be-
tween DOJ Fraud and Biomet, Inc. (Biomet), the company
agreed to "continue to implement and maintain a compliance
and ethics program designed to prevent and detect violations of
the FCPA and other applicable anticorruption laws throughout
its operations, including those of its affiliates, joint ventures,
contractors, and subcontractors, with responsibilities that in-
clude interactions with foreign officials or other high-risk activ-
ities." 57 Thus, the enforcement action included the
admonishments contained in the Organizational Guidelines,
but it did so in a narrow manner that focused solely on ensur-
ing that Biomet employed a compliance and ethics program
5s See, e.g., Plea Agreement at 13, United States v. ABB, Inc., No. H-10-664
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2010), ECF No. 12 (requiring ABB to "implement a compliance
and ethics program designed to ... prevent violations of the FCPA, U.S. commer-
cial bribery laws, and all applicable foreign bribery laws").
54 See DESIO, OVERVIEW, supra note 48 (explaining that the organizational
sentencing guidelines apply when organizations engage in criminal conduct).
55 See CRIM. DIv. U.S. DEP'T JUST. & ENFORCEMENT Div. U.S. SEC. & ExCH.
COMMISSION, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPr PRACTICES ACT 4
(2012) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE].
56 See, e.g., Veronica Root, The Monitor- "Client" Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV.
523, 540 (2014) [hereinafter Root, Monitor-"Client"]; F. Joseph Warin et aL, Some-
body's Watching Me: FCPA Monitorships and How They Can Work Better, 13 U. PA.
J. Bus. L. 321, 347-48 (2011).
57 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 6, United States v. Biomet, Inc., No.
1:12-cr-00080 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2012), ECF No. 1-1.
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that was designed to ensure that another FCPA or similar viola-
tion would not occur.
C. Pressure from Private Parties
In addition to direct governmental mandates and enforce-
ment-related incentives to employ certain compliance pro-
grams, organizations must often find mechanisms to adopt
compliance reforms in order to engage in certain business rela-
tionships with other private parties.-8 For example, Clorox has
instituted a "Business Partner Code of Conduct," which ex-
plains that it expects "the practices of [its] partners to reflect
[Clorox's] own."59 The code details "business practice stan-
dards for [Clorox's] direct suppliers of goods, service providers,
consultants, distributors, licensees, joint ventures, contractors
and temporary workers."6 0 Clorox's code provides general gui-
dance on the importance of adhering to human rights require-
ments, safe working conditions, environmental regulations,
and compliance with fair business practices and applicable
laws.6 1 It then provides information on how to make inquiries
regarding appropriate compliance with the code and then goes
on to detail sanctions that could be levied against business
partners for violating Clorox's code. 62 Specifically, the code
states:
We may pursue legal or other sanctions against any business
partners who violate the Code or applicable laws when con-
ducting Clorox business. We may also immediately termi-
nate the business relationship, and any related contracts, to
the extent permitted by applicable laws. We may also choose,
in our sole discretion, to enter into a remediation plan with
non-compliant business partners, in which the business
partner agrees to take corrective action to fix the business
misconduct within a defined period of time.63
Similarly, Oracle has a "Partner Code of Conduct and Busi-
ness Ethics," which is applicable to Oracle Partners, "resellers,
and to all personnel employed by or engaged to provide services
s8 See Scott Killingsworth, The Privatization of Compliance, in TRANSFORMING
CoMPLIANCE 33, 33 (RAND Corp., 2014).
59 THE CLOROX Co., BUSINESS PARTNER CODE OF CONDUCT 2 (2013).
60 Id.
61 See id. at 4, 9-13.
62 Id. at 6-7.
63 Id. at 7.
10 16 [Vol. 102:1003
2017] COORDINATING COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES
to [the Oracle Partner] throughout the world."64 Oracle's code
explicitly requires a heightened standard of conduct by its bus-
iness partners, stating "[wihere local laws are less restrictive
than this Code, [the Oracle Partner] must comply with the
Code, even if [the Oracle Partner's] conduct would otherwise be
legal."6 5 The Oracle code is primarily concerned with activities
that might violate requirements under the FCPA and similar
laws, antitrust and competition laws, intellectual property
rights, securities laws, and export control laws. 6 6 Oracle's code
also details mechanisms for reporting violations of the code.6 7
It concludes by explaining that "[a]ny violation of this Code will
constitute the basis for the immediate termination of [the Ora-
cle Partner's] distribution agreements with Oracle and the can-
cellation of any pending fees payable to [the Oracle Partner],
pursuant to applicable laws and without any liability to
Oracle."6 8
This type of private pressure for the adoption of compliance
programs is necessary because companies are "increasingly
accountable not only for their own compliance" but also that of
their business partners, which motivates corporations to ob-
tain contractual assurances that business partners are en-
gaged in acceptable compliance practices. 69 Additionally, in
some arenas, a "prerequisite for conventional access to capital"
is the utilization of a system of compliance risk management. 70
Indeed, "corporate credit agreements and securities underwrit-
ing agreements commonly include additional representations
and covenants that the borrower/issuer has 'implemented and
maintains policies and procedures designed to ensure, and
64 ORACLE, PARTNER CODE OF CONDUCT AND BUSINESS ETHICS 2, http://
www.oracle.com/partners/en/how-to-do-business/opn-agreements-and-poli-
cies/019520.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R53-RWUA].
65 Id.
66 See id. at 3-6.
67 See id. at 7-8.
68 Id. at 8.
69 Killingsworth, supra note 58, at 33.
70 Id. at 38. The government has made its preference for private parties to
demand specific compliance requirements from their partners explicit in recent
statements from senior government officials. See, e.g., Stephen Dockery, U.S.
Justice Department Outlines Metrics for New Compliance Expert, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
2, 2015, 11:27 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/11/02/u-s-
justice-department-outlines-metrics-for-new-compliance-expert/ [https://
perma.cc/2YSX-UUSS] (explaining that metrics for determining when to charge a
company criminally will include whether third parties are informed of compliance
expectations).
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which are reasonably expected to continue to ensure, compli-
ance' with specified laws."7 1
Thus, the ad hoc system by which many private firms have
instituted their compliance programs is motivated not only by
governmental actors but also by private parties that have a
sufficient amount of influence to encourage their business
partners to adopt specific reforms as a condition of the busi-
ness relationship.
Corporations today confront demands from a variety of
sources to implement compliance programs that meet very spe-
cific requirements. Whether the pressure comes from a stat-
ute, regulation, prosecutor, or business partner, corporations
that want to remain competitive must satisfy a number of dif-
ferent compliance priorities. 72 And while the Organizational
Guidelines provide a potentially strong incentive to encourage
companies to employ comprehensive compliance programs, the
impetus for developing or revamping compliance programs is
often communicated to firms on an ad hoc basis that is tied to
ensuring compliance with a specific area of the law.
Thus, it may be that corporations are being encouraged to
implement piecemeal compliance programs at the possible ex-
pense of more comprehensive compliance efforts. Indeed, be-
cause corporations are often responding to the threat of
sanction when engaging in reforms to their compliance pro-
grams, they may focus the majority of their efforts on areas
where the firm deems itself vulnerable to receiving a sanction.
The rationality of this approach becomes apparent when one
looks at corporate repeat offenders more closely.
II
CORPORATE REPEAT OFFENDERS: A CASE STUDY
Governmental actors-both regulators and prosecutors-
are often charged with evaluating the effectiveness of a corpo-
ration's compliance program when misconduct is discovered
within a firm. This evaluation is necessary for determining an
appropriate sanction to be levied against the firm engaged in
misconduct.7 3 Yet, as shown in this Part, governmental actors
71 Killingsworth, supra note 58, at 38.
72 See id. at 33-34.
73 See DESIO, OVERVIEW, supra note 48 (explaining that the organizational
sentencing guidelines incorporate "the preventive and deterrent aspects of sys-
tematic compliance programs").
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are often focused on discrete issues within firms' compliance
programs, which allows firms to engage in multiple violations
of legal and regulatory requirements without governmental
consideration of whether firms should be treated as recidivists.
Given the variety of potential violations that can occur within a
firm and the number of governmental actors that investigate
and prosecute such violations, gatekeepers within firms may
have an incentive to prioritize complying with regulations on a
piecemeal basis instead of considering the effectiveness of the
firm's compliance program from a more comprehensive
standpoint.
As this Part reveals, many corporate entities settling claims
of misconduct in one area of law go on to settle allegations of
corporate wrongdoing in another legal area. Using FCPA en-
forcement actions brought by DOJ Fraud as a starting point,
this Part demonstrates that firms are sometimes treated as
recidivists when they engage in multiple violations of a legal
requirement investigated by the same governmental enforce-
ment agent but are not treated as recidivists when subsequent
violations of law are resolved with multiple governmental agen-
cies or departments.
A. Methodology74
The past decade saw a renewed effort to ensure companies
adhere to the statutory requirements under the FCPA. As a
result, FCPA enforcement actions have increased exponentially
with high profile, governmental sanctions levied against com-
panies in a variety of industries.7 5 To determine how the gov-
ernment may be treating corporate repeat offenders, I began by
identifying corporate entities that entered into deferred prose-
cution agreements, non-prosecution agreements, or guilty
pleas settling FCPA violations with DOJ Fraud from 2004 to
2016.76 I then reviewed other agency enforcement actions'
74 See Appendices.
75 See FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions, U.S. DEP'T JUST., http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/a.htmi [https://perma.cc/7VVF-
WRJM] (last updated Jan. 12, 2017) (providing a list of linked cases to related
enforcement actions).
76 I chose 2004 as a starting point, because it is generally understood as the
time period that began robust FCPA enforcement by DOJ Fraud. See, e.g., Warin
et al., supra note 56, at 325 (stating that 2007 saw a large increase in enforcement
actions). One flaw that became apparent in this methodology is that companies in
industries where FCPA violations apparently are less common were not captured
in the research. For example, multinational bank HSBC has entered into several
well-publicized settlement agreements with the SEC, DOJ, OFAC and the U.S.
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) since 2012. See News Release, Fed.
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websites, including the DOJ Antitrust division,7 7 SEC, 78 Fed-
eral Trade Commission,79 Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC),80 and Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign
Asset Control' for unrelated settlement agreements with that
company. I also conducted internet searches using the name
of a company with at least one known FCPA violation and
searched for the terms "settlement," "fraud," and "false claims."
Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Announces Settlement with HSBC (Sept. 12, 2014),
http://www.ffifa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Announces-Settlement-
with-HSBC.aspx [https://perma.cc/J97F-4MNX; Press Release, U.S. Attorney's
Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Settles Civil Fraud Claims
Against HSBC Bank for Failure to Monitor Fees Submitted for Foreclosure-Re-
lated Services (July 1, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/
July 14/HSBCSettlementPR.php [https://perma.cc/325X-JNFC]; Press Release,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A. Admit to
Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in De-
ferred Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-money-laundeing-and-
sanctions-violations [https://perma.cc/8GW4-S2KH]; Press Release, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges HSBC's Swiss Private Banking Unit with Providing
Unregistered Services to U.S. Clients (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/
PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543534789#.VQhOXkKprzI ihttps://
perma.cc/8KXD-HMVN; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. Settles Potential Civil Liability for
Apparent Violations of the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, OFF. OF FOREIGN
ASSET CONTROL: ENFORCEMENT INFO., (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20131217_hsbc.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C2N7-W9EQ]. However, since HSBC has not entered into a settlement
related to FCPA, its repeated violations are not reflected in this section of the
Article. A different data set could be created by using a different agency enforce-
ment action's database as the starting point rather than the FCPA or by searching
a regulatory news column such as the Wall Street Journal Risk and Compliance
Journal. Risk & Compliance Journal, WALL STREET J., http://www.wsj.com/
news/risk-compliance-journal [https://perma.cc/5B9H-9ZBE].
77 Antitrust Case Filings, U.S. DEP'T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/atr/
cases/index.html#page=page-1 [https://perma.cc/KYG2-5P6U].
78 Administrative Proceedings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION, http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/admin.shtml Ihttps://perma.cc/8FKZ-R4TH] (last modi-
fied Mar. 10, 2017). A Google search of the company name and "SEC" or "SEC
settlement" may be more effective as this database is less searchable than other
databases.
79 Cases and Proceedings, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/en
forcement/cases-proceedings [https://perma.cc/BR63-D86Q].
80 Enforcement Bureau, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.gov/enforce-
ment-bureau [https://perma.cc/FY5E-FB69] (last updated Mar. 3, 2017). A
Google search of the company name and "FCC," "FCC violation" or "FCC settle-
ment" may be more effective, as this database is not as easily searched.
81 Civil Penalties and Enforcement Information, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY, http://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Pages/civpen-index2.
aspx [https://perma.cc/BZ25-SRY2]. A Google search of the company name and
"OFAC," "OFAC violation," or "unauthorized export" may be more effective. See
also Enforcement, U.S. DEP'T COM.: BUREAU OF INDUSTRY & SECURITY, https://
www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/enforcement [https://perma.cc/N8SU-JLY7]
(describing the Bureau of Industry and Security Export Enforcement's mission).
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I found this to be the most effective way to find additional
violations, particularly for False Claims Act violations.8 2
B. High-Level Results
From 2004 to 2016, DOJ Fraud entered into deferred pros-
ecution agreements, non-prosecution agreements, or guilty
pleas with 159 separate companies.8 3 These separate compa-
nies, however, are often related entities. When the related enti-
ties are treated as one corporate entity, ninety-four separate
corporate entities are found to have entered into deferred pros-
ecution agreements, non-prosecution agreements, or guilty
pleas with DOJ Fraud from 2004 to 2016.84 Of these ninety-
four corporate entities, thirty-three involved a guilty plea to
settle an alleged FCPA violation.8 5 Of these thirty-three corpo-
rate entities that entered guilty pleas, one appeared twice due
to multiple FCPA violations a few years apart; therefore, be-
cause tracking the repeat offenses for each appearance would
result in double-counting, this effectively leaves thirty-two rele-
vant corporate entities.8 6 I focused on these thirty-two corpo-
rate entities when attempting to identify repeat offenses
because if a company was required to enter into a guilty plea,
as opposed to being allowed to enter into a civil enforcement
action, it may signal more egregious or troubling misconduct.8 7
82 The DOJ Civil Division prosecutes False Claims Act violations but does not
appear to maintain an enforcement actions database, unlike other agencies. See,
e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Biomet Companies to Pay over $6 Million
to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations Concerning Bone Growth Stimulators
(Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/biomet-companies-pay-over-6-
million-resolve-false-claims-act-allegations-concerning-bone [https://perma.cc/
4JS8-4VPR [hereinafter 2014 Biomet Press Release] (providing an example of an
enforcement action under the False Claims Act).
83 See infra app. A. There was an element ofjudgment in compiling the list of
total companies entering into agreements because the identity of each corporation
was not reported in a uniform fashion. Sometimes each subsidiary entering into
an agreement with the DOJ was apparent in a press release, in other instances
the information was located within the body of the agreement, and in still other
examples the information was found in an appendix to the applicable agreement.
As a result, the more reliable and replicable number is the corporate entity
number.
84 The vast majority of these ninety-four entities were identified by utilizing
the "year" search function on the DOJ Fraud FCPA enforcement actions page.
There were three companies from 2011, however, that were not properly tagged as
occurring in that year. They were identified by going through the alphabetical list
of enforcement actions on the DOJ Fraud website.
85 See infra app. B.
86 See infra app. C, entries ##1 & 15.
87 See, e.g., RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 55, at 52-53 (describing the consid-
erations of DOJ prosecutions, including the history of the corporation's miscon-
duct in other criminal, civil, or regulatory enforcement).
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Of the thirty-two corporate entities that entered into guilty
pleas to resolve alleged FCPA violations, twenty-two did not
engage in additional instances of misconduct within a five-year
period of the relevant FCPA offense.88 This yielded a data set8 9
of ten corporate entities that have settled multiple allegations
of FCPA violations or settled FCPA violations and settled
charges of unrelated, unlawful conduct under a different stat-
ute within a relatively short period (generally five years). The
case study analyzes these ten corporate entities in an effort to
glean insight regarding repeat misconduct by corporate
entities.
C. Multiple Offense Categories
Among the ten firms identified, similarities emerged where
the unrelated settlements concern violations: (i) with the same
or similar unlawful objectives and behavior, (ii) with the same
or similar unlawful behavior but dissimilar unlawful objectives,
and (iii) that do not share any characteristics in terms of the
type of unlawful behavior or unlawful purpose. Concerns re-
garding possible corporate recidivist conduct are most appar-
ent for the first category of firms and look to be inapposite for
those in the third category.
1. Category 1: Same or Similar Unlawful Behavior and
Unlawfuil Purpose
The two corporate entities in this category-Hewlett-Pack-
ard and Marubeni-were involved in repeated violations that
shared the same or similar unlawful behavior and unlawful
purpose. Hewlett-Packard entered into settlement agreements
to resolve charges of bribery or improper payments under the
FCPA and entered settlements related to entirely separate in-
stances of paying customer kickbacks, such as improper pay-
ments or other unlawful inducements in violation of the Anti-
Kickbacks Act, the False Claims Act, and related fraud regula-
tions. Marubeni entered into two settlement agreements to re-
solve charges of bribery under the FCPA without committing
violations of other regulatory or legal areas. This section dis-
cusses the Hewlett-Packard violations, as they demonstrate the
challenge with deterring similar misconduct when it falls under
diverse regulatory areas.
88 See infra app. C.
89 See infra app. C.
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Hewlett-Packard entered into three settlement agreements
from 2010 to 2014 to resolve different instances of improper
payments. Specifically, in August 2010, Hewlett-Packard
agreed to pay $55 million to settle charges that it "knowingly
paid kickbacks, or 'influencer fees,' to systems integrator com-
panies in return for recommendations that federal agencies
purchase [Hewlett-Packard's] products."9 0 That settlement
agreement also covered allegations that Hewlett-Packard had
submitted defective pricing under government contracts.9 1
Then, in November 2010, Hewlett-Packard entered into a
$16.25 million agreement with the FCC to settle charges that it
had provided improper inducement and gratuities to school
officials in the Houston and Dallas Independent School Dis-
tricts while it was also bidding on contracts to supply equip-
ment to the school districts under the FCC E-Rate program. 92
"Meals and entertainment-including trips on a yacht and tick-
ets to the 2004 Super Bowl-were provided by the contractors
to get inside information and win contracts that were supposed
to be awarded through a competitive bidding process."93 This
behavior violated the FCC's competitive bidding rules.9 4 Fi-
nally, in 2014, Hewlett-Packard and its subsidiaries agreed for
the subsidiaries to plead guilty to bribery of Russian officials
and to pay more than $108 million to settle allegations that
subsidiaries in Russia, Poland, and Mexico made unlawful fa-
cilitating payments or paid bribes to public officials to win con-
tracts, which violated the FCPA.95
90 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Hewlett-Packard Agrees to Pay the
United States $55 Million to Settle Allegations of Fraud (Aug. 30, 2010), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hewlett-packard-agrees-pay-united-states-55-million-
settle-allegations-fraud [https://perma.cc/8FFB-WNQX [hereinafter HP Fraud
Press Release].
91 Id.
92 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Settles Lawsuits Against Hewlett-
Packard and Intervenes Against Its Business Partners for Violating FCC Competi-
tive Bidding Rules in Texas (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-
settles-lawsuits-against-hewlett-packard-and-intervenes-against-its-business-
partners [https://perma.cc/9LYQ-KK4X] [hereinafter HP Bid Rigging Press
Release].
93 Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, HP to Pay $16.25 million to Settle
DOJ-FCC E-Rate Fraud (Nov. 10, 2010), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs-public/at-
tachmatch/DOC-302764A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5S2-X69P].
94 HP Bid Rigging Press Release, supra note 92.
95 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Hewlett-Packard Russia Agrees to
Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
hewlett-packard-russia-agrees-plead-guilty-foreign-bribery [https://perma.cc/
3STH-ZQTM]. Hewlett-Packard, the parent company, did not enter into a plea
agreement with DOJ Fraud, but it did enter into a settlement with the SEC and
agreed to pay $31,472,250 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest. Id.
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In each instance, employees gave unlawful payments or
gifts with the purpose of inducing the recipients to award Hew-
lett-Packard business opportunities. Hewlett-Packard was not,
however, treated as a recidivist in any of the plea or settlement
agreements. Indeed, in determining the appropriate fine for
Hewlett-Packard's 2014 FCPA violation, the DOJ included two
mitigating factors to support the imposition of a fine that was
less than the minimum fine calculated under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. Specifically, "the misconduct . . . was
largely undertaken by employees associated with [Hewlett-
Packard's Russian subsidiary], which employed a small frac-
tion of [Hewlett-Packard's] global workforce[,]" and "neither
[Hewlett-Packard] nor the [Russian subsidiary] ha[d] previously
been the subject of any criminal enforcement action by the
[DOJ] or law enforcement authority in Russia or elsewhere."96
While it is true that Hewlett-Packard's alleged E-Rate fraud and
alleged violation of the False Claims Act in 2010 were both civil
offenses, not criminal offenses, in all three instances Hewlett-
Packard employees paid unlawful bribes or other inducements
to win contracts. The offenses fall under three different regula-
tions-the False Claims Act, the FCC's competitive bidding
rules, and the FCPA-and the 2010 and 2014 offenses were
prosecuted by different divisions of the DOJ-the Civil Division
in 2010 and the Criminal Division in 2014- yet there are clear
similarities in both the manner and goal of Hewlett-Packard's
misconduct.
It may seem as if the examples of Hewlett-Packard and
Marubeni's repeat misconduct, which are characterized as
having the same or similar unlawful behavior and unlawful
purpose, are flukes and not representative of a more concern-
ing trend. As such, it is important to note that if the case study
were expanded to include companies entering into deferred or
96 Plea Agreement at 17, United States v. ZAO Hewlett-Packard A.O., No.
5:14-cr-00201 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/cases/hewlett-packard-zao/hp-russia-plea-agreement.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6LFP-ZA6H]. This factor was mentioned only in HP's Russian subsidi-
ary's plea agreement. The settlement agreements covering the Polish and Mexican
subsidiaries do not contain any language to this effect. See Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, United States v. Hewlett-Packard Polska, SP. Z 0.0., No. 5:14-cr-
00202 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
cases/hewlett-packard-polska/hp-poland-dpa.pdf [https://perma.cc/EFM5-
U59T]; Letter from Melinda Haag, United States Attorney et al. to F. Joseph Warin,
Counsel for Hewlett-Packard Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V. (Apr. 9, 2014), http://
fcpa.stanford.edu/fcpac/documents/3000/002202.pdf Ihttps://perma.cc/
HD57-PW881.
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non-prosecution agreements with DOJ Fraud, other examples
similar to those of Hewlett-Packard become apparent.9 7
2. Category 2: Similarities in Unlawful Behavior but Not
Unlawful Purpose
The second category of repeat offenders contains two cor-
porate entities that entered into settlement agreements regard-
ing unlawful conduct where the goals of the conduct were
different between the two settlements, but the manner of be-
havior was similar. Specifically, ABB, Inc.98 and Bridgestone
97 For example, in 2011, Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay $21.4 million as
part of a settlement agreement to resolve charges claiming that its subsidiaries
had violated the FCPA by making improper payments to government officials in
Greece, Poland, and Romania and paying kickbacks under the United Nations Oil
for Food Program. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Johnson & Johnson
Agrees to Pay $21.4 Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act and Oil for Food Investigations (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/johnson-johnson-agrees-pay-214-million-criminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-
corrupt-practices-act [https://perma.cc/SFJ6-XULH]. In 2013, Johnson &
Johnson entered into a $2.2 billion settlement agreement to resolve criminal and
civil charges of health care fraud, including paying kickbacks to physicians to
induce them to prescribe medications that had been unlawfully misbranded and
to pharmacies to encourage pharmacists to promote the use of Johnson & John-
son's pharmaceuticals. These improper payments resulted in the submission of
false claims to federal health care programs, making Johnson & Johnson liable
under the False Claims Act. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Johnson &
Johnson to Pay More than $2.2 Billion to Resolve Criminal and Civil Investiga-
tions (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/johnson-johnson-pay-more
-22-billion-resolve-criminal-and-civil-investigations [https://perma.cc/4C46-
RPEG]. In both cases, Johnson & Johnson employees made unlawful payments
to facilitate broader use of their products or to secure contracts. Yet the settle-
ment agreements concerning the civil charges, including the charges of improper
payments and inducements, contain no consideration of Johnson & Johnson's
previous violations. See id.
Biomet serves as yet another example of this type of repeat corporate miscon-
duct. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, United States v. Biomet, Inc., No.
1:12-cr-00080 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2012), ECF No. 1-1; Settlement Agreement be-
tween the United States of America and Biomet, Inc. at 1, United States v. Biomet
Orthopedics, Inc., No. 07-8133, 2007 WL 2964201 (D. N.J. Sept. 27, 2007), http:/
/www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nj/Press/files/pdffiles/Older/BiometCivilSet-
tiement.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTZ9-MAAJ]; U.S. DEP'T JUST., CORPORATE INTEG-
RITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN OIG-HHS AND BIOMET, INC. 19, 31 (2007), http://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-nj/legacy/2013/11/29/BiometCIA92
707.pdf [https://perma.cc/YAL4-PXYL]; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Five
Companies in Hip and Knee Replacement Industry Avoid Prosecution by Agreeing
to Compliance Rules and Monitoring (Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/flles/usao-nj /legacy/20 13/11 /29/hipsO927.rel.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z6G3-YLVF); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Third Medical Device
Company Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (Mar. 26, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/third-medical-device-company-resolves-foreign-
corrupt-practices-act-investigation [https://perma.cc/7YSS-2SE6].
98 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd.
Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Bid Rigging on USAID Construction Contract in Egypt
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Corporation (Bridgestone)9 9 each entered into settlement
agreements related to FCPA violations and, separately, for en-
gaging in anticompetitive behavior in violation of the Sherman
Act. The underlying unlawful behavior in these instances was
similar in that for both the FCPA and the antitrust violations
the firms were involved in conspiracies with other entities to
achieve unlawful objectives. However, the unlawful purpose
for the FCPA and antitrust violations differed. In the case of the
FCPA violations, the firms were attempting to obtain a competi-
tive advantage over their competitors, but in the case of the
antitrust violations, the purpose of the conspiracy was to work
with competitors to protect profits through bid rigging, price-
fixing, and agreeing not to compete for certain business. 0 0
Interestingly, in separate enforcement actions, each corpo-
rate entity was treated as a recidivist for repeated violations
under the FCPA or antitrust regulations, but the recidivism
treatment only occurred when appearing before the same gov-
ernmental actor on a second occasion.101 For example, when
Bridgestone pleaded guilty in October 2011 to engaging in
(Apr. 12, 2001), http://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press releases/
2001/7984.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6NE-B7SM]; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, ABB Ltd and Two Subsidiaries Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Investigation and Will Pay $19 Million in Criminal Penalties (Sept. 29, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/abb-ltd-and-two-subsidiaries-resolve-foreign-
corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-will-pay [https://perma.c/ZN4S-VRSP].
99 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bridgestone Corporation Agrees to
Plead Guilty to Participating in Conspiracies to Rig Bids and Bribe Foreign Gov-
ernment Officials (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bridgestone-
corporation-agrees-plead-guilty-participating-conspiracies-rig-bids-and-bribe-0
[perma.cc/28LT-88TV] [hereinafter Bridgestone 2011 Press Release]; Press Re-
lease, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bridgestone Corp. Agrees to Plead Guilty to Price
Fixing on Automobile Parts Installed in U.S. Cars (Feb. 13, 2014), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bridgestone-corp-agrees-plead-guilty-price-fixing-auto-
mobile-parts-installed-us-cars [https://perma.cc/HN8W-PZDZ] [hereinafter
Bridgestone 2014 Press Release].
100 There is, of course, similarity in unlawful purpose in that the FCPA and
antitrust conspiracies were both engaged in to achieve greater profits. Obtaining
increased profits, however, is typically what motivates corporate misconduct. As
Professor Geoffrey P. Miller has explained, "illegal behavior might increase rather
than reduce profits." Miller, Compliance Function, supra note 32, at 6.
101 As with the Category 1 offense type, if the data set were expanded to
include deferred and non-prosecution agreements, additional corporate entities
would be identified that would also fit within Category 2. See, e.g., Plea Agree-
ment, United States v. Akzo Nobel Chems. Intern'l B.V., No. 06-0160 (N.D. Cal.
May 17, 2006) http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f216300/216369.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6WAW-96J9]; Press Release, U.S. Dep't Justice, Akzo Nobel Acknowl-
edges Improper Payments Made by Its Subsidiaries to Iraqi Government Under
the U.N. Oil for Food Program, Enters Agreement with Department of Justice (Dec.
20, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/December/
07_crm_1024.html [https://perma.cc/2UFU-D4W5].
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price-fixing within the marine hose industry, as well as to the
FCPA violations, it failed to disclose that it had also partici-
pated in an anti-vibration rubber parts conspiracy. 1 0 2 When
Bridgestone's additional anticompetitive behavior was discov-
ered in 2014, it was sanctioned for not disclosing the miscon-
duct in 2011.1os A DOJ Antitrust official stated that, "[tihe
Antitrust Division will take a hard line when repeat offenders
fail to disclose additional anticompetitive behavior."1 0 4 Thus,
participating in multiple violations of the same underlying stat-
ute triggered mention that the firm was a repeat offender, but
as is shown in the Category 1 discussion, corporate entities
that violated different underlying statutes are often not treated
as repeat offenders. 105
3. Category 3: No Similarities in Unlawful Behavior or
Purpose
Six corporate entities engaged in multiple violations in
compliance areas that were unrelated in both unlawful pur-
pose and manner of misconduct. For example, BAE Systems
settled multiple incidents of unrelated misconduct from 2010
to 2015, including alleged violations of the FCPA106 and the
102 Bridgestone 2014 Press Release, supra note 99.
103 See Bridgestone 2011 Press Release, supra note 99; Bridgestone 2014
Press Release, supra note 99.
104 Bridgestone 2014 Press Release, supra note 99 (quoting Brent Snyder,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division).
105 It should be noted that the enforcement strategy at DOJ Antitrust is sub-
stantively different than that of other law enforcement agencies because it has
traditionally "place[d] little emphasis on the importance of an effective compliance
program to prevent cartel behavior." Joseph Murphy & William Kolasky, The Role
ofAnti-Cartel Compliance Programs in Preventing Cartel Behavior, 26 ANTITRUST 61,
63 (2012) http:/ /summerconvention.utahbar.org/2014/materials/H2-Car-
tel%20Compliance%2OPrograms.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZ3B-ZBZX. Indeed,
while "the U.S. Attorneys' Manual instruct[s] federal prosecutors to consider com-
pliance programs, the Antitrust Division obtained a complete carve-out for itself."
Id. (footnotes omitted). Recent scholarship has, however, noted a recent shift in
antitrust policy towards a greater emphasis on the importance of adopting and
maintaining a robust compliance program. D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Compliance,
in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 155, 155 (Michael A. Hitt et al.
eds., 2016).
106 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and
Ordered to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bae-systems-plc-pleads-guilty-and-ordered-pay-400-
million-criminal-fine [https://perma.cc/MYS2-ULUCI.
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False Claims Act, 0 7 as well as allegations of wrongful discrimi-
nation10 8 and violations of the Arms Export Control Act. '09
The importance of the above categories should not be over-
blown, and the findings of the case study could be reframed as
demonstrating a continuum upon which corporate repeat mis-
conduct of differing severity falls. The upshot, however, is that
firms in the above case study with multiple violations in differ-
ent statutory or compliance areas have not been treated as
recidivists, despite, in some instances, similarities in their un-
lawful behavior and unlawful purposes across multiple viola-
tions. And the firms with repeated violations that have been
identified as recidivists have only been identified as such when
appearing before the same governmental actor on multiple
occasions.11 0
There could be a number of plausible reasons for the gov-
ernment's failure to sanction repeat corporate misconduct. As
explained in Part I, different governmental actors handle differ-
ent types of statutory and regulatory violations in a piecemeal
fashion. Additionally, the government currently does not seem
to track recidivist behavior across diverse statutory or regula-
tory areas. Moreover, the government does not employ an en-
forcement strategy that permits it to levy heightened sanctions
against firms that engage in repeated instances of legal viola-
tions across diverse regulatory or statutory areas. These
choices with regard to the government's enforcement strategy,
however, may reflect information, coordination, or responsibil-
ity challenges, rather than signaling a strategy of purposeful
non-enforcement.
107 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Defense Contractors Settle Alleged
Violation of the False Claims Act for $5.5 Million (Sept. 16, 2014), https://
wwwjustice.gov/usao-mn/pr/defense-contractors-settle-alleged-violation-false-
claims-act-55-million [https://perma.cc/2XRU-H7BQ.
108 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settle-
ment with Virginia-Based BAE Systems Ship Repair Inc. (Dec. 28, 2011), https://
wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmnent-reaches-settlement-virginia-based-
bae-systems-ship-repair-inc [https://perma.cc/GK7U-6YTG].
109 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, BAE Systems plc Enters Civil Settlement
of Alleged Violations of the AECA and ITAR and Agrees to Civil Penalty of $79
Million (May 17, 2011), https://www.foley.com/files/BAES StateDeptReleasel8
mayll.pdf [https://perma.cc/53EP-2U73].
110 See, e.g., Plea Agreement at 11 United States v. ABB Inc., No. H- 10-664
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2010), ECF No. 12 (appearing twice before the DOJ); Bridge-
stone 2014 Press Release, supra note 99 (appearing twice before the DOJ).
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Parts I and II have established that current regulatory and
enforcement priorities have led to a system of piecemeal com-
pliance that fails to address firms that engage in repeated in-
stances of misconduct. This Part begins by explaining how
information, coordination, and identified responsibility chal-
lenges may contribute, at least partially, to the government's
failure to recognize and sanction repeat corporate misconduct.
The Part then argues that efforts to improve corporate compli-
ance incentives would benefit from regulatory mechanisms
that (i) recognize when an institution is engaged in recidivist
behavior across diverse regulatory areas and (ii) aggressively
sanction institutions that are repeat offenders. The Part next
provides a proposal for reform, which utilizes existing reporting
obligations, a new compliance officer model within the DOJ,
and the Organizational Guidelines.
A. Information, Coordination, and Identified Responsibility
Challenges
Governmental enforcement agencies and actors are also
subject to the information and coordination complexities that
confront many regulatory agencies within the current adminis-
trative state. Importantly, these information and coordination
challenges may lead to a responsibility vacuum when consider-
ing issues of corporate recidivists.
The first challenge is the interagency coordination prob-
lem.1 1 ' "Congress often assigns more than one agency the
same or similar functions or divides authority among multiple
agencies, giving each responsibility for part of a larger
whole."11 2 When scholars consider these problems, they typi-
cally focus on the fact that multiple agencies deal with the
same basic legal area or problem." 3 As a result, the traditional
concern regarding interagency coordination is with "overlap-
ping delegations of power"1 4 and, for purposes of this Article,
the redundancies that overlapping authority can create within
enforcement efforts.'15 For example, both DOJ Fraud and the
SEC have authority to sanction companies for FCPA viola-
111 See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory
Space, 125 HARv. L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2012).
112 Id.
113 See id.
114 Id.
I"s Id. at 1135.
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tions.116 As a result, many FCPA violations result in sanctions
from both governmental entities, which necessarily require
sharing of information and procedural coordination between
the two governmental actors.1 17 For areas of law where inter-
agency coordination has been readily identified, there have
been efforts by governmental agents to cooperate with each
other. For example, in response to the 2007-2009 financial
crisis, an interagency task force was created which included
representatives from the DOJ, the Department of Treasury, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the
SEC."" Similarly, the DOJ's Environment and Natural Re-
sources Division often partners with the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency and state and local officials when prosecuting
pollution and, wildlife crimes and pursuing civil enforcement
actions.11 9
The interagency coordination problem may arise differently
than how it is traditionally viewed, however, because of the
numerous governmental agencies and actors responsible for
sanctioning corporate misconduct as segmented participants
in a larger governmental enforcement strategy. Agencies that
might not be considered to have overlapping zones of authority
may in fact have an element of shared enforcement space be-
cause they may both need to sanction the same organization
for engaging in corporate misconduct. For example, the FCC
requires companies to comply with certain competitive bidding
rules domestically, while the FCPA prohibits bribery of foreign
officials.1 2 0 The shared regulatory space of the two governmen-
tal actors is not necessarily apparent when one focuses in on
the discrete statutory and regulatory area each actor is respon-
sible for enforcing. But in practice, both the FCC and FCPA
may end up sanctioning an organization for engaging in unlaw-
116 SALEN CHUR ET AL., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, COMPLYING WITH THE FOR-
EIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: A PRACTICAL PRIMER 3 (2012), http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/criminal-justice/
FCPAComplianceReport.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.c/ATQ8-JSWA).
117 See, e.g., Warin et al., supra note 56, at 328-37 (discussing FCPA enforce-
ment actions brought from 2004-2011 and highlighting when those actions were
brought by the SEC, DOJ, or both enforcement actors).
118 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, President Obama Establishes
Interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (Nov. 17, 2009) https://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-249.htm [https://perma.cc/32CP-MC6G].
The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force replaced the Corporate Fraud Task
Force, which was established in 2002. Id.
119 About the Division, U.S. DEP'T JUST.: ENV'T & NAT. RESOURCES DIVISION,
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/about-division [https://perma.ce/J95N-QV8P].
120 See supra section II.C. 1.
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ful bribery. activities. 1 2 1 This raises the question of when, if
ever, it might be appropriate for seemingly diverse regulatory
agencies to share information about corporate misconduct and
sanctions in an effort to ensure that private firms have the
proper incentives to deter repeat corporate misconduct and
adopt the "effective compliance and ethics program" outlined in
the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines and espoused by se-
nior governmental officials. Traditional attempts at improving
interagency coordination have focused on the initial enforce-
ment action or prosecution and not on recidivist conduct,
which makes tackling the issue of repeat corporate misconduct
a unique issue in need of further consideration.
The second challenge is intra-agency coordination. Agency
heads, "as opposed to Congress[,]" are responsible for "de-
sign[ing] internal structures and processes to further their own
regulatory agendas."l 22 Thus, while Congress delegates au-
thority to the SEC to protect investors,1 23 the agency itself
makes decisions about its own organizational structure and
processes.1 24 Agencies that are responsible for corporations'
compliance with certain legal and regulatory requirements rou-
tinely have to work through various intra-agency coordination
problems. The DOJ, however, presents a unique challenge.
The DOJ is a cabinet-level agency,1 2 5 which is made up of a
variety of traditional administrative agencies.1 2 6 The DOJ is
responsible for handling "all criminal prosecutions and civil
suits in which the United States ha[s] an interest," but it does
so through an organizational structure that includes "various
components, offices, boards and divisions."' 2 7 Thus, the intra-
agency coordination challenges facing the DOJ are highly com-
121 Id.
122 Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 429
(2015).
123 What We Do, U.S. SEc. & EXCH. COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml {https://perma.cc/E3FR-RPUA] (last modified June 10, 2013).
124 See, e.g., Delegation of Authority to the Director of its Division of Enforce-
ment, 76 Fed. Reg. 35,348, 35,348 (June 17, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 200) (outlining the SEC's amendment of its internal rules to delegate authority
to issue witness immunity orders to the SEC Director of the Division of
Enforcement).
125 See Organization, Mission and Functions Manual: Overview, U.S. DEP'T
JUST. (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.jistice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-and-
functions-manual-overview [https://perma.cc/J6EE-EHH9].
126 See, e.g., Rules and Regulations, BUREAU ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS &
EXPLOSIVES, https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations [https://perma.cc/
35HR-79DG] (explaining that "federal agencies such as ATF" must engage in
public rulemaking).
127 About DOJ, U.S. DEP'T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/about [https://
perma.cc/4N97-EUAZ].
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plex and, in some instances, include what look more like inter-
agency coordination issues. On a more basic level, however,
the DOJ also determines how to coordinate enforcement ac-
tions and it has done so through a variety of specialized divi-
sions. These specialized divisions, like DOJ Antitrust and DOJ
Fraud, are faced with information and coordination problems
when both divisions have the opportunity or responsibility to
bring enforcement actions against the same organization for
misconduct. 1 2 8 They can properly address the violations as
separate instances of misconduct without engaging in informa-
tion sharing and coordination between divisions, but they can
also choose to work in a more cooperative manner, particularly
as it pertains to corporate repeat offenders.
The third challenge is a potential responsibility vacuum.
When multiple agencies or divisions are responsible for main-
taining enforcement actions against the same company, they
tend to focus on their particular grant of authority. DOJ Anti-
trust focuses on ensuring that companies are not engaged in
anticompetitive behavior, 12 9 while the SEC ensures that public
companies comply with the securities laws.13 0 But that leaves
open the question of which, if any, enforcement actor or agency
should be concerned when a company is engaged in repeated
instances of organizational misconduct across diverse regula-
tory areas.
B. Greater Detection & Increased Sanctions
Given current regulatory and enforcement behavior of gov-
ernmental actors, compliance personnel within private firms
have strong incentives to ensure that a company that is found
to have engaged in a particular type of misconduct, such as
improper bribery of officials in an effort to obtain favorable
contracts, does not participate in future, similar miscon-
duct.131 Those responsible for effectuating the firm's compli-
ance program have a strong incentive to revamp and bolster
efforts to ensure the firm's long-term compliance with the par-
ticular regulatory or statutory requirement that led to the firm
receiving a governmental sanction.1 32 For example, in 2012,
128 See supra section II.C.2.
129 See Mission, U.S. DEP'T JUST.: ANTITRUST DIVISION, https://www.justice.gov/
atr/mission [https://perma.cc/IYU5-QXMV] (last updated July 20, 2015).
130 See supra note 123.
131 See supra subpart I.C.
132 See generally Miller, Economic Analysis, supra note 26, at 9-18 (using
economics to demonstrate why firms have strong incentives to stay in
compliance).
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Biomet entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the
DOJ and SEC to resolve allegations that it violated the FCPA 3 3
and agreed to retain a compliance monitor.1 3 4 Two years later,
Biomet disclosed possible further FCPA violations, which oc-
curred both before and after Biomet entered into the 2012 de-
ferred prosecution agreement. After a period of investigation,
the DOJ "informed Biomet that the [deferred prosecution
agreement] and the independent compliance monitor's ap-
pointment [would be] extended for an additional year."' 3 5
Thus, Biomet received an additional set of sanctions due to its
failure to effectively address flaws within its FCPA compliance
program.
Compliance personnel, however, have less of an incentive
to conduct a systematic overhaul or audit of the firm's entire
compliance program in response to legally diverse instances of
misconduct. For example, HSBC's conduct over the past sev-
eral years has garnered a great deal of attention within certain
segments of the media, yet it has not been the subject of addi-
tional sanctions based on its recidivist conduct.1 3 6 Indeed, in
2012, a Senate subcommittee conducted a highly critical inves-
tigation of HSBC, which resulted in a 339-page report that
determined that the bank repeatedly failed to detect interna-
tional money laundering, connections to terrorist financing,
and violations of U.S. economic and trade sanctions.13 7 Yet
even this strong evidence of significant compliance failures
within HSBC has not prompted governmental actors to treat
HSBC as a recidivist and require it to engage in a systematic,
comprehensive overhaul of its compliance programs and
policies. 138
Thus, compliance personnel that serve as gatekeepers
within firms currently have weak incentives to focus on com-
prehensive compliance overhauls. In particular, while firms
133 Biomet, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 17, 2015), http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/351346/000090342315000219/biomet-
8k_0317.htm [https://perma.cc/76ZT-95M2] [hereinafter Biomet Form 8-K]; see
also Samuel Rubenfeld, The Morning Risk Report: Biomet Hit by Recidivism, WALL
STREET J.: RISK COMPLIANCE J. (Mar. 19, 2015, 7:24 AM) http://blogs.wsj.com/
riskandcompliance/2015/03/19/the-morning-risk-report-biomet-hit-by-brib-
ery-recidivism/ [https://perma.cc/DVE6-TXXXI.
134 See Veronica Root, Modem-Day Monitorships, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 109,
122-23 (2016) [hereinafter Root, Modem-Day Monitorships] (discussing the rise of
monitorships and resulting differences amongst monitorship types).
135 Biomet Form 8-K, supra note 133.
136 See supra Introduction.
137 See S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 15.
138 See id.
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rely heavily on corporate "gatekeepers" to prevent and detect
compliance failures,1 39 they are also rational actors that re-
spond to possible monetary fines as well as to the probability
that the government will levy such fines.1 4 0 By treating corpo-
rate misconduct across legal areas as separate and distinct
violations, governmental actors may be missing an opportunity
to make repeated violations more costly to corporations. As a
result, it may be that government regulators should consider
increasing the sanctions for corporate repeat offenders. In-
creasing sanctions may result in more desirable incentives for
corporate wrongdoers to engage in more effective self-policing
through improved internal compliance programs. 141
Classic law and economics literature regarding deterrence,
however, assumes that "sanctioning repeat offenders more se-
verely cannot be socially advantageous if deterrence always
induces first-best behavior."' 42 In those instances, "[r]aising
the sanction because of [the repeat offender's] record of prior
convictions would overdeter [the repeat offender] now."14 3 Im-
plicit, however, in this view of deterrence is that the govern-
ment has chosen an appropriate sanction for corporate
misconduct, when in reality the state will often "tolerate some
underdeterrence in order to reduce enforcement expenses." 4 4
This reality is unsurprising when one considers that law
and economics theory has explained that strict liability en-
forcement, while the best regime "for inducing firms to sanction
culpable agents," 145 "may actually deter firms from monitoring,
investigating, or reporting" corporate misconduct.14 6 A private
139 Root, Modem-Day Monitorships, supra note 134, at 118-19.
140 Miller, Economic Analysis, supra note 26, at 9.
141 Recent scholarship, however, has suggested that the use of deferred or
non-prosecution agreements and similar prosecutorial mandates should be im-
posed "only on firms with policing deficiencies attributable to 'policing agency
costs,'" which are "costs [that] arise when the firm's senior managers or board of
directors personally benefit from either wrongdoing or deficient corporate polic-
ing." Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through
Non-Prosecution, U. CHI. L. REv. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 3), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2833902. This scholarship, how-
ever, has not specifically addressed the situation of corporate repeat offenders
and whether instances of similar, repeat misconduct might warrant a different
type of governmental enforcement strategy.
142 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of
Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 403, 438 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell eds., 2007).
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 701 (1997).
146 Id. at 707.
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firm subject to a strict liability regime will have a decreased
incentive to detect misconduct within its organization because
it will definitively result in a sanction for the firm without con-
sideration of the corporation's actions or culpability.
The upshot is that achieving perfect compliance with legal
and regulatory requirements within private firms may actually
deter those firms from implementing effective compliance and
ethics programs, and thus the government chooses not to hold
corporations responsible for obtaining perfect compliance,
thereby creating a world where there is underdeterrence.
[As such,] making sanctions depend on offense history may
be beneficial for two reasons. First, the use of offense history
may create an additional incentive not to violate the law: if
detection of a violation implies not only an immediate sanc-
tion, but also a higher sanction for a future violation, [a re-
peat offender] will be deterred more from committing a
violation presently. Second, making sanctions depend on of-
fense history allows society to take advantage of information
about the dangerousness of [repeat offenders] and the need
to deter them. 147
Thus, if the government treated a firm that engaged in
repeat offenses within a specified period as a recidivist subject
to a heightened sanction regime, the government could address
challenges associated with underdeterrence and make non-
compliance with legal and regulatory requirements a greater
priority for the firm. A simple economic analysis of the compli-
ance function would "[aissume that employees in a rational,
profit-maximizing, risk-neutral firm engage in random illegal
on-the-job conduct. The government imposes a fine 4 on the
firm for proven violations, which is administered with
probability p. The firm [thus] experiences a sanction pt for
violations." 1 4 8  If governmental actors increase both the
probability of and the amount of a potential fine or other pen-
alty, they can effectively increase the sanction of compliance for
both variables, thereby making recidivist behavior a particu-
larly costly endeavor for the firm.
In short, efforts to improve corporate compliance may ben-
efit from coordinated regulatory mechanisms that (i) recognize
when an institution is engaged in recidivist behavior across
diverse regulatory areas and (ii) aggressively sanction institu-
tions that are repeat offenders. By increasing the recognition of
firms engaged in recidivist conduct, governmental actors could
147 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 142, at 438-39 (footnote omitted).
148 Miller, Economic Analysis, supra note 26, at 9.
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increase the probability that a sanction might be levied against
the institution. By increasing the amount of monetary fines or
other penalties that a firm faces when it engages in recidivist
conduct, governmental actors can increase the "costs" of mis-
conduct to the organization and encourage it to consider re-
structuring its entire compliance program. Employing such a
strategy would not be an effort meant to achieve perfect deter-
rence, but it instead would be a method of strengthening the
government's current deterrence strategy by taking into ac-
count the practical reality that the government's current en-
forcement regime does not in fact result in "perfect" deterrence
and instead sometimes underdeters corporate misconduct.
C. A Proposal for Reform
There are likely a variety of mechanisms that governmental
actors can employ to increase the probability of detection or the
potential fine or other penalties for organizations that engage in
recidivist conduct. This Article proposes mechanisms aimed to
make recidivism more costly within private firms, and these
proposals rely upon tools that are already available to govern-
mental actors. 149 The proposal outlined below could be imple-
mented almost immediately, without the need for Congress to
pass a statute or for a regulator to engage in a lengthy notice-
and-comment rulemaking process.
1. Proposal for Increasing Detection of Recidivist
Behavior
When the DOJ informed Biomet that it would be requiring
the deferred prosecution agreement and appointment of the
compliance monitor to be extended for another year, Biomet,
on the same day, reported this information to the SEC via Form
8-K.1 5 0 The SEC requires public companies to file a variety of
reports. Form 10-K is an annual filing and Form 10-Q is a
149 There are, however, arguments opposed to the idea that imposing more
severe sanctions will assist in deterring corporate misconduct. See, e.g., Miriam
H. Baer, Too Vast to Succeed, 114 MICH. L. REv. 1109, 1134 (2016) (reviewing
Garrett, supra note 3) ("If you want to condemn corporate offenders, encourage
internal reform, and improve corporate culture, then perhaps you should do less.
Enact narrower theories of corporate criminal liability; devise laws and guidelines
that constrain prosecutorial andjudicial discretion; and impose collateral conse-
quences only in response to a predefined set of circumstances . . . ."); Griffith,
supra note 24, at 2134 ("Getting the government out of the compliance business
would prevent core corporate governance functions from being designed in an
opaque process by a largely unaccountable agent with no expertise in organiza-
tional design and no ability to measure effectiveness.").
150 Biomet Form 8-K, supra note 133.
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quarterly filing.1 5 1 The SEC, however, requires public compa-
nies to "report certain material corporate events on a more
current basis." 152 "Form 8-K is the 'current report' companies
must file with the SEC to announce major events that share-
holders should know about." 53 Thus, Biomet's filing of a Form
8-K on the day that the DOJ informed it that it would be sub-
ject to another year under the deferred prosecution agreement
and monitorship was not an accident. It was a requirement.
All public companies that enter into agreements to resolve
allegations of misconduct with governmental actors are re-
quired to file a Form 8-K disclosing the event to shareholders.
The disclosures would also be found within the firm's quarterly
10-Q or annual 10-K, but the disclosure would be amongst
other required filing information. The Form 8-K, however, is
limited to discussions of current events; thus, when they are
filed, it becomes readily apparent to those reviewing the docu-
ment what "major events" triggered the form's filing. 5 4
Government actors could implement a policy of reviewing
Form 8-Ks as a mechanism for detecting recidivist behavior by
firms. This system could be operationalized in a number of
ways, but a new officer within the DOJ provides a model for
how the DOJ could improve inter- and intra-agency coordina-
tion with regards to corporate recidivism.
In September 2015, the DOJ announced that it was "creat-
ing a new compliance counsel position in the Criminal Division
to assess the effectiveness of an entity's compliance program
and help prosecutors decide whether or how to charge an entity
under investigation."15 5 One key component of the new coun-
151 Form 8-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION http://www.sec.gov/answers/
form8k.htm [https://perma.cc/P825-AWB3] [hereinafter Form 8-K].
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. While it does appear that some publicly traded firms attempt to miti-
gate the effect of filing negative news by providing the disclosure after trading
hours, this behavior by firms does not appear to have a significant impact on
investor behavior and would be irrelevant to the proposal outlined in this Article,
because the proposed review would not be tied to the market timing of the disclo-
sure. See generally Benjamin Segal & Dan Segal, Are Managers Strategic in Re-
porting Non-Earnings News? Evidence on Timing and News Bundling, 21 REv.
AcCT. STUD. 1203, 1238 (2016) ("While managers are clearly timing the release of
negative news to exploit perceived investor inattention, there is no evidence of this
strategy bearing fruit.").
155 Alison Tanchyk et al., Morgan Lewis Explains New DOJ Counsel to Focus on
Corporate Compliance, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept. 11, 2015), http://clsbluesky.
law.columbia.edu/2015/09/11/morgan-lewis-explains-new-doj-counsel-to-fo-
cus-on-corporate-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/T94J-9D4U]. The compliance
counsel works specifically with DOJ Fraud at this time, but the DOJ could
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sel's position is to distinguish between an effective compliance
program and a paper program.1 5 6 In November 2015, the DOJ
provided more details regarding the metrics the compliance
expert would utilize in determining whether and how a com-
pany should be charged criminally.1 5 7 The metrics have been
summarized as follows for organizations:
* Do directors and managers offer strong support for corpo-
rate compliance policies?
* Do compliance personnel have stature in the company?
Do the compliance teams get the resources they need?
* Are compliance policies clear and in writing? Are they eas-
ily understood and translated[?]
* Are the compliance policies effectively communicated to
employees? Are they easy to find and do employees get
repeated training?
* Are the compliance policies updated?
* Are there ways to enforce the compliance policies and is
compliance incentivized and violators disciplined?
* Are third parties informed of compliance expectations? 15
Additionally, the compliance counsel's assessment of compli-
ance programs within financial institutions would also include
the following.
* Can the financial institution identify its customers?
* Is the company complying with U.S. laws?
* Are reports of suspicious activity shared with other
branches or offices?
* Do banks with a U.S. presence give U.S. senior managers
a "material role" in compliance?
* Is the company candid with regulators?159
Absent, almost shockingly so, is a metric looking at
whether the organization has engaged in past instances of mis-
conduct. Because the new compliance counsel is delegated its
authority via the intra-agency discretion of the DOJ, the DOJ
department heads have complete authority and autonomy over
the metrics the compliance counsel utilizes in making her as-
sessments regarding an organization's compliance program. 160
Adding an additional metric to the compliance counsel's as-
broaden the compliance counsel's scope of authority or employ another compli-
ance counsel with oversight over multiple DOJ divisions.
156 Id.
157 Dockery, supra note 70.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 See Sue Reisinger, Report: Justice Dept. Names Chen to Controversial Com-
pliance Counsel Post, CORP. CouNs. (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.corpcounsel.
com/id=1202737784530/Report-Justice-Dept-Names-Chen-to-Controversial-
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sessment tools would be relatively easy to implement, particu-
larly given the compliance counsel's infancy within the DOJ.e1 6
The current compliance counsel works exclusively with DOJ
Fraud, but the position could serve as a model for the type of
position the DOJ could create to assist it in its efforts to detect
recidivist behavior both within the DOJ and with other federal
regulators and agencies.
Thus, under this prong of the proposal, the government
could, for example, create a system whereby three settlement
disclosures via Form 8-Ks within a five-year period trigger an
automatic referral from the SEC to a new DOJ compliance
counsel as well as to any regulator with which the company
settled allegations of institutional misconduct within the pre-
ceding five years. After a review of the past instances of mis-
conduct, if the DOJ compliance counsel were to determine that
the company was engaged in behavior that warrants recidivist
treatment, the DOJ could then flag the company as requiring
recidivist treatment if future misconduct by the firm is uncov-
ered. In essence, the DOJ would have the tools necessary to
create a list of firms that should be treated as recidivists. The
list could be made available to all federal regulators along with
a request that the DOJ be notified if a regulator is contemplat-
ing entering into an agreement to settle claims of misconduct
by the relevant organization within the next few years.
In another formulation, the DOJ compliance counsel could
make it a part of her routine to regularly check Form 8-Ks
when assessing an organization's compliance program. If Form
8-Ks from a specified period of time, like five years, indicated
multiple instances of misconduct, the compliance counsel
could consider that when determining what and how the DOJ
should ultimately pursue an enforcement action against the
corporation.
Regardless of how the review of Form 8-Ks is operational-
ized by DOJ compliance counsel, the government is already in
possession of all the data and resources it needs to allow it to
effectively assess the types of misconduct that corporations are
resolving with governmental actors. The upshot is that the
government could improve its ability to detect recidivist behav-
ior without requiring corporations to disclose additional infor-
mation. Increased detection of recidivist behavior could result
Compliance-Counsel-Post?slretum=20151010192409 [https://perma.ce/Y94D-
XTLT].
161 The compliance counsel began work at the DOJ on November 3, 2015. See
Dockery, supra note 70.
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in a greater probability that additional sanctions might be lev-
ied against firms that engage in repeated acts of misconduct
across diverse legal and regulatory areas.
2. Proposal for Increasing Potential Fines or Other
Penalties
Traditional economic analysis suggests that a sufficient
monetary fine can deter misconduct within private firms.1 6 2
The sophisticated corporation of today, however, should proba-
bly budget for an expected monetary penalty as a result of
institutional misconduct. HSBC, for example, has paid literally
billions of dollars in fines over the past five years. As part of the
company's 2012 deferred prosecution agreement alone, HSBC
agreed to pay $1.92 billion in fines,' 63 yet the company has
continued to engage in various forms of misconduct and, as a
result, has been subjected to additional penalties in the form of
high fines.1 6 4
Thus, it appears that the private firms of today are all too
willing to pay monetary fines as a consequence for failing to
prevent and detect misconduct. These same firms, however,
have shown a strong distaste for other forms of non-monetary
penalties. Governmental actors, of course, routinely use a
package of monetary and non-monetary penalties in their at-
tempts to create incentives for corporations to behave in an
ethical and compliant manner.1 6 5 But this Article proposes
that governmental actors should consider finding additional,
non-monetary penalties that are generally considered to be un-
desirable to private firms and levy those "heightened" penalties
against recidivist firms in addition to more standard monetary
162 See Miller, Compliance Function, supra note 32, at 16 ("The most effective
sanction against an offending organization is a fine; but fines can be obtained in
civil enforcement actions without the high burden of proof and constitutional
protections required in criminal cases."). But see Sonia A. Steinway, Comment,
SEC "Monetary Penalties Speak Very Loudly," but What Do They Say? A Critical
Analysis of the SEC's New Enforcement Approach, 124 YALE L.J. 209, 222-24
(2014) (explaining the mixed evidence for fines as an effective enforcement tool for
corporations).
163 Aruna Viswanatha & Brett Wolf, HSBC to Pay $1.9 Billion U.S. Fine in
Money-Laundering Case, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2012, 6:15 PM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/11 /us-hsbc-probe-idUSBRE8BAO5M201212
11 [https://perma.cc/4A9C-BAD8].
164 See supra Introduction.
165 See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 32, at 71 (2014) (criticizing the ability of
prosecutors to engage in effective corporate governance reform efforts): see also
Brandon L. Garrett, Rehabilitating Corporations, 66 FIA. L. REV. FORUM 1, 3 (2014)
(suggesting judges take a more active role in overseeing the agreed-upon
penalties).
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fines and non-monetary penalties. There are likely a variety of
particularly distasteful non-monetary penalties-penalties that
corporations would go to extraordinary lengths to avoid-that
the government could promote as part of its enforcement
strategies.
This Article proposes that the government focus on three
such penalties, which are graduated in nature. Adopting these
three penalties would permit the government to adopt an en-
forcement strategy that increases its criminal enforcement ac-
tions against recidivist corporations while substantially
decreasing potential civil resolutions of corporate misconduct
for recidivists. In particular, public companies that have en-
gaged in wrongdoing are reluctant to (i) receive a concrete find-
ing of guilt'6 6 that declares that the firm participated in
conduct that violates legal and regulatory requirements;
(ii) allow broad, direct access of its internal workings to govern-
mental actors out of fear that this information could flow to
third-parties and be used against the firm in subsequent civil
litigation;167 and (iii) cede authority to a court-appointed
master, trustee, or monitor.16 8 These sorts of penalties are
considered to be especially unpalatable to private firms, which
makes them particularly well-suited for creating incentives for
corporations to make comprehensive compliance reform a pri-
ority before they engage in recidivist conduct and can become
subject to these sorts of heightened penalties.
a. Pursue Official Findings of Guilt
Governmental actors' reliance upon civil enforcement ac-
tions is rational given the reluctance on the part of corpora-
tions to enter into guilty pleas acknowledging criminal
behavior.
Organizational defendants don't want to admit to criminal
behavior, both because doing so will damage their reputa-
tions and also because the plea may be used against them in
subsequent civil litigation. In many cases, therefore, the
166 Miller, Compliance Function, supra note 32, at 16-17.
167 See, e.g., Root, Monitor-"Client, " supra note 56, at 545-48 (discussing AIG's
reluctance to enter into a settlement agreement without an order of binding confi-
dentiality from the court that would prevent the monitor from turning over its
findings to parties other than the government).
168 See Root, Modem-Day Monitorships, supra note 134, at 116-22 (discussing
the use of traditional, court-appointed monitorships and modern-day, court-or-
dered monitorships and the customary unwillingness of companies to enter into
those types of monitorships).
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need to admit guilt in a plea bargain will be a stumbling block
to settlement.
To avoid this problem, the government has devised alter-
native remedies: deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs)
and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs).169
However, the government's reliance on civil enforcement ac-
tions puts limits on the government's ability to utilize the Orga-
nizational Guidelines, which contemplate a regime of increased
sanctions for recidivist firms by providing heightened penalties
for firms that engage in "similar misconduct."o7 0 If governmen-
tal actors pursue a strategy aimed at obtaining findings of guilt
from recidivist organizations, whether by plea or fact-finder
determination, it would function as a heightened penalty as
compared to the status quo and, if a finding of guilt were ob-
tained, it would make additional, non-monetary penalties
available for the government to seek against the recidivist cor-
poration. Pursuing official findings of guilt against corpora-
tions might initially appear much more costly than entering
into negotiated settlement agreements, but many firms will
plead guilty without risking the costs of going to trial where, if
found guilty, they could be subject to greater monetary fines
and other penalties than if they were to enter into a plea agree-
ment. 17 1 Thus, the additional costs of pursuing official find-
ings of guilt may not, in practice, be significant.
b. Allowing the Government Broad Access to the Firm's
Internal Workings
The Organizational Guidelines, which are the proper
source of authority for determining an organization's sanction
after a finding of guilt or guilty plea, provide a framework for
levying higher penalties on firms that engage in recidivist be-
havior. Indeed, in its Introductory Commentary, the Organiza-
tional Guidelines outline four factors that will "increase the
ultimate punishment of an organization," and one of those fac-
tors is "the prior history of the organization."1 7 2 The guidelines
169 vliller, Compliance Function, supra note 32, at 16-17.
170 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 cmt. 3(F) (U.S. SENTENCING
COil'N 2016).
171 See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REv.
1775, 1786, 1789 (2011) (explaining that even when prosecutors "seek an indict-
ment and conviction," which can have "possibly dire consequences for the corpo-
rations," they "typically result[ ] in a plea bargain and not a trial," and noting that
if, for example, Siemens had been convicted at trial, the possible fines it would
have been required to pay would have been much greater than what it paid under
a plea agreement).
172 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, introductory cmt.
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explain that "Irlecurrence of similar misconduct creates doubt
regarding whether the organization took reasonable steps" to
meet the guidelines' admonishment to adopt an effective com-
pliance and ethics program. 173 Thus, the guidelines set out a
variety of consequences for organizations that are found guilty
or who have pleaded guilty to engaging in misconduct and for
firms that engage in recidivist behavior.
One such consequence is a term of corporate probation.17 4
The government cannot guarantee that a court will order a
term of corporate probation, but it can adopt a strategy of
aggressively recommending that the court order a period of
corporate probation for firms that engage in recidivist conduct.
The guidelines outline several conditions that "may be appro-
priate" to order as part of an organization's corporate proba-
tion. 1 7 5 One available condition states that:
The organization shall submit to: (A) a reasonable number of
regular or unannounced examinations of its books and
records at appropriate business premises by the probation
officer or experts engaged by the court; and (B) interrogation
of knowledgeable individuals within the organization. Com-
pensation to and costs of any experts engaged by the court
shall be paid by the organization. 17 6
Corporations who are engaged in misconduct often spend a
great deal of time and money avoiding penalties of this nature,
in part, because once information is provided to the govern-
ment, it can be subject to certain reporting obligations under
the Freedom of Information Act.1 77 Additionally, information
that becomes part of a "judicial record" is typically information
that courts must make publicly available, and if a court uses
the information gathered by the probation office or expert, it
could transform the businesses information into a publicly
available, judicial record.17 8
Thus, if governmental actors adopt an enforcement strat-
egy that attempts to achieve, as a condition of probation, broad
access to the internal workings of recidivist firms, it would
likely serve to heighten the penalties associated with engaging
in recidivist behavior. This, in turn, would create an incentive
173 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 cmt 2(D).
174 See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1. 1 (describing sce-
narios where the court is required to order probation).
175 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.4(b).
176 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 8D1.4(b)(5).
177 See Root, Monitor-"Client," supra note 56, at 547.
178 For a more in-depth discussion of these issues, see Root, Monitor-"Client,"
supra note 56, at 540-49.
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for private firms to ensure their compliance programs are effec-
tive on a comprehensive, as opposed to a piecemeal, basis
when incidents of misconduct occur and trigger a compliance
review.
c. Court-Appointed Master, Trustee, or Monitor
The Organizational Guidelines also outline a set of height-
ened penalties for firms that (i) were found to be guilty of engag-
ing in misconduct, (ii) were ordered to undergo a term of
corporate probation, and (iii) violated a condition of proba-
tion.1 7 9 "Upon a finding of a violation of a condition of proba-
tion, the court may extend the term of probation, impose more
restrictive conditions of probation, or revoke probation and re-
sentence the organization." 8 0 The Commentary to § 8F1. 1
goes on to explain that "[iun the event of repeated violations of
conditions of probation, the appointment of a master or trustee
may be appropriate to ensure compliance with court orders."1'8
Corporations do not like retaining monitors in a civil con-
text where, arguably, the corporation has some power to nego-
tiate the scope of the monitorship and the breadth of the
monitor's duties.1 8 2 Thus, it is unsurprising that corporations
(i) appear to hold a great deal of disdain for the imposition of
court-ordered masters, trustees, or monitors and (ii) have en-
gaged in protracted battles to invalidate court mandates impos-
ing these sort of third parties.18 3
Again, governmental actors cannot guarantee that the
court will appoint a master, trustee, or monitor, but they can
choose to adopt an enforcement strategy that aggressively lob-
bies the court to formally impose a master, trustee, or monitor
when a private firm is involved in repeated instances of wrong-
doing. The adoption of such a strategy would likely serve to
increase the non-monetary penalties that firms would be sub-
ject to in the case of recidivism, and it would provide a strong
incentive for corporations to ensure that their compliance pro-
grams are designed to ensure comprehensive, as opposed to
piecemeal, compliance with legal and regulatory requirements.
179 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8F1.1.
180 Id.
181 Id. cmt.
182 See generally Root, Monitor-"Client," supra note 56, at 540-49 (discussing
negotiated monitorships); Root, Modem-Day Monitorships, supra note 134, at
133-37 (describing Apple's court battle to limit the scope of its monitorship);
Warin et al., supra note 56, at 365-68 (describing how a corporation may negoti-
ate the scope of a monitorship).
183 See Root, Modem-Day Monitorships, supra note 134, at 130-37 (discussing
court-ordered monitorships).
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The proposals outlined would enable the government to
adopt an enforcement strategy that increases the potential
sanction for corporate repeat offenders by utilizing existing
governmental resources and policies. Increased coordination
amongst various governmental actors paired with a shift in the
sanctions pursued against corporate repeat offenders would
create a strong incentive for firms to assess the effectiveness of
their compliance programs as a whole when misconduct occurs
as opposed to focusing narrowly on a particular compliance
area.
IV
BENEFITS, OBJECTIONS, & UNRESOLVED CONCERNS
This Article's proposed framework has several potential
benefits if embraced by governmental actors, and this Part be-
gins with a description of a few such benefits. The Part goes on
to discuss objections to the proposal presented. The Part con-
cludes by addressing some unresolved concerns raised by the
Article.
A. Potential Benefits
This Part will address five ways in which this Article's pro-
posal might assist in efforts to improve compliance programs
within private firms. First, it will improve the ability of the
government to identify and sanction corporate repeat offend-
ers. Second, the detection mechanism outlined allows for an
unbiased standard for reviewing an organization's past mis-
conduct. Third, the Article's proposal is based on a "standard"
instead of an easy to manipulate "bright-line rule." Fourth, it
will encourage organizations to put a greater emphasis on ar-
chitecture, as opposed to policing, strategies when focusing on
their compliance programs. Fifth, the proposal may encourage
private firms to put a greater emphasis on promoting ethicality
in their workforce.
1. Improved Ability to Treat Recidivists as Such
Subpart III.A explained how information, coordination, and
reputation challenges or deficiencies contribute to the govern-
ment's failure to properly detect and aggressively sanction cor-
porate repeat offenders. This Article's proposal directly
addresses these problems.
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To the extent that a lack of information contributed to the
government's failure to properly detect corporate repeat offend-
ers, the proposal's reliance on Form 8-Ks allows reliable, non-
biased information to serve as the basis for a review of the
relevant corporate entity for recidivist conduct.1 84 Form 8-K
review will allow for both interagency coordination of the infor-
mation, because any enforcement action brought by agencies
outside of the DOJ would be captured in Form 8-K reporting,
and intra-agency coordination, because enforcement actions
brought by separate divisions of the DOJ would also be cap-
tured. Form 8-Ks provide a concrete and reliable mechanism
for identifying prior civil and criminal enforcement actions
brought against the corporate wrongdoer.
One might, however, question whether there is actually an
information problem amongst governmental agencies and ac-
tors because enforcement actions are often easy to discover
when one runs an internet search or follows certain enforce-
ment and compliance news sources.' 8 5 One might argue that
governmental enforcement agents should begin enforcement
actions by running a corporate background check, so to speak,
to determine whether other corporate misconduct has recently
occurred. If previous offenses are identified, the government
enforcement agent could choose to require a more draconian
sanction than what it would normally pursue. This is impor-
tant because if government enforcement agents are aware of
past misconduct and actively choose not to pursue heightened
sanctions, it might not indicate an information problem but
instead reflect the government's unwillingness to sanction cor-
porate repeat offenders.18 6 The lack of heightened sanctions
for recidivists may merely be a reflection of a lack of political
will and not indicative of any sort of information problem or
deficiency.
The information problem raised by this Article, however,
does not take place in a vacuum, and the Article is not claiming
that government enforcement agents are technically unaware
of the enforcement actions brought by their counterparts at
other agencies. Instead, the Article is arguing that the informa-
tion problem is inextricably tied to the coordination and re-
184 See Form 8-K, supra note 151 (describing all corporate activities that re-
quire investor notification).
185 See, e.g., COMPLIANCE WEEK, https://www.complianceweek.com [https://
perma.cc/L6V6-2U4M (reporting and analyzing enforcement actions).
186 But see Katrice Bridges Copeland, Enforcing Integrity, 87 IND. L.J. 1033,
1035 (2012) (explaining that a government policy avoiding punitive measures
against companies may be meant to avoid harming innocent third-parties).
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sponsibility challenges associated with inter- and intra-agency
coordination and related to the incentivizing of corporations to
adopt ethics and compliance programs that will prevent corpo-
rate recidivism.
DOJ Fraud may be aware that it is entering into a settle-
ment agreement with a company that entered into an agree-
ment with the FCC the previous year, but DOJ Fraud has no
current incentive to expend additional resources for pursuing
recidivist conduct that is unrelated to the types of misconduct
DOJ Fraud is charged with prosecuting. DOJ Fraud has a
limited budget and limited resources in the form of attorneys
and other employees, so it is likely rational for DOJ Fraud to be
concerned solely with the types of corporate misconduct within
its zone of responsibility.
Thus, this Article's proposal seeks to coordinate formal re-
view of enforcement actions brought by diverse governmental
agents via Form 8-K review and to designate responsibility for
this review to a particular person (or persons) responsible for
considering whether a corporation has an effective ethics and
compliance program. By tasking a specific individual with re-
viewing the Form 8-Ks, someone within the DOJ will have spe-
cific authority for making recommendations regarding the
appropriate enforcement strategy against a particular corpora-
tion. This individual could be given direct responsibility and, if
deemed appropriate by DOJ agency heads, could alert other
interested governmental actors and agencies to the compliance
counsel's findings. Thus, the individual line attorney at DOJ
Fraud would no longer be responsible for considering whether
a heightened sanction should be pursued in a particular man-
ner due to the corporate defendants past, unrelated miscon-
duct. Instead, the individual line attorney would get a formal
recommendation by the new DOJ compliance counsel to pur-
sue a more aggressive sanction. This formal recommendation
would help motivate the individual line attorney to pursue
more aggressive sanctions against corporate repeat offenders
as part of larger enforcement efforts that are more expansive
than the goals of the attorney's particular agency or
department.
Thus, this Article's proposal promotes a more coordinated
enforcement effort amongst various governmental enforcement
actors. This coordinated effort will allow for more complete
consideration of whether a corporation's compliance program
is deficient in some manner.
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2. Unbiased Standard for Detection and Evaluation
Another benefit of the Article's proposal is that it utilizes an
unbiased standard for detecting and evaluating repeated in-
stances of misconduct at private firms. Utilizing the Form 8-K
for detecting repeat offenders ensures that the detection mech-
anism is not easy to manipulate based on the notoriety of the
company or past instances of misconduct. This Article's detec-
tion mechanism allows an unbiased trigger to prompt the com-
pliance counsel's review of past misconduct by public
companies. Without an unbiased mechanism, one might be
concerned that a recidivism review would occur most often
when there was widespread knowledge of an organization's
misconduct, but that would allow smaller companies or com-
panies whose misconduct is of the sort that is unlikely to gar-
ner much media attention to escape heightened sanctions for
recidivist conduct.
3. Proposes a "Standard" Verses a "Rule"
Additionally, the compliance counsel's review is part of a
"standard," not a "rule." Once a corporate entity is referred to
the compliance counsel for consideration regarding the effec-
tiveness of the firm's compliance program, the proposal allows
for an independent review of the corporate entity's policies and
procedures when making a determination as to whether the
firm should be subject to more aggressive enforcement actions
and sanctions. Thus, this Article's proposal is more of a stan-
dard than a rule, because it does not require recidivist treat-
ment when a corporation has engaged in a particular number
of offenses. Instead, the proposal leaves discretion with the
compliance counsel and the relevant enforcement officials
about the best way to proceed in addressing issues of compli-
ance at a particular corporate entity, given the particular facts
and circumstances presented.
In this context, a rule might be easy for a corporate entity
to game for its advantage.'8 7 For example, if a rule was
adopted that five settlement agreements within a five-year pe-
riod automatically required a more aggressive prosecutorial
187 See, e.g., Allan Sloan, 7easwy's Game of Whac-A-Mole: Keeping Corporate
Taxes in the USA, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/treasury-will-need-to-bring-its-a-game-of-whac-a-mole/
2016/04/01/94431f06-f675-11e5-a3ce-fO6b5ba2lf33_story.html [https://
perma.cc/SQA5-FEXZ] (describing the Treasury Department's struggle to enforce
penalties against companies that evade US tax authorities through corporate
inversions).
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posture by the DOJ, a company might not be motivated to
overhaul its compliance program until it entered the fourth
settlement. Alternatively, the company may attempt to stall
entering into a fifth settlement agreement until a time period
where earlier settlement agreements fell outside the relevant
five-year period. Rules are easy to predict and, therefore, easy
to game.
However, the standard outlined in this Article's proposal is
less vulnerable to corporate gamesmanship because elements
of prosecutorial discretion remain intact. The proposal ad-
dresses the coordination problems inherent in the U.S. en-
forcement structure and apparatus, but does not sacrifice the
individualized review necessary to ensure that more aggressive
prosecutions are brought only when warranted by the particu-
lar facts and circumstances surrounding the effectiveness of
the ethics and compliance program at the firm being evaluated.
4. Greater Emphasis on Corporate Architecture Strategies
This Article's proposal, by improving coordination amongst
governmental enforcement agents and encouraging more ag-
gressive prosecutions and sanctions for corporate repeat of-
fenders, is aimed at incentivizing corporations to improve their
compliance programs. There are, however, different types of
compliance activity within firms.
Much of the work engaged in by compliance professionals
falls into two broad categories: "the corporate policing ap-
proach that is familiar to many[ ] and a structural approach
one might call 'corporate architecture."' 188 "The policing ap-
proach reduces corporate crime by empowering internal police-
men to identify, punish, and deter actual and would-be
transgressors."1 8 9 In contrast, the "architectural approach en-
courages corporate personnel to seek out and mitigate prob-
lematic situations as opposed to problematic .people. It seeks
proactively to improve decision-making systems, thereby re-
ducing the opportunity and temptation for fraud. It is at once
less judgmental and yet potentially more intrusive." 9 0
The corporate policing approach is easier for firms to im-
plement, but the corporate architecture approach is equally
important.' 9 ' If governmental actors were to engage in efforts
to treat repeat offender firms as recidivists, it might encourage
188 Baer, supra note at 31, at 93.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 94.
191 See id. at 148.
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corporations to increase the amount of time they spend engag-
ing in corporate architecture strategies. Instead of focusing
almost solely on detecting and punishing misconduct, firms
would need to think more proactively about areas where they
are vulnerable to compliance failures. In turn, firms would
need to identify and implement proactive strategies aimed at
mitigating compliance failures that might occur in the future
based on their risk assessment.
An emphasis on increased policing, as opposed to better
corporate architecture strategies, is evident in numerous re-
sponses to corporate misconduct. For example, JPMorgan re-
cently adopted an aggressive policing strategy in response to
"government probes into fraudulent mortgage-bond sales, the
$6.2 billion London Whale trading loss, services provided to
Ponzi-scheme operator Bernard Madoff and the rigging of cur-
rency and energy markets." 192 In the past three years, the
company "has hired 2,500 [new] compliance workers and spent
$730 million" to improve its compliance operations.19 3 Addi-
tionally, the company is utilizing an algorithm with dozens of
inputs in an attempt to "identify rogue employees before they
go astray."l 94 JPMorgan's clear response to corporate miscon-
duct is to strengthen its internal policing strategies, but polic-
ing strategies are only one piece of an effective ethics and
compliance program.
JPMorgan's emphasis on policing strategies is important
because excessive monitoring and policing of employees "may
unintentionally erode compliance norms" within firms.1 9 5 "For
example, heavy-handed [policing] methods may trigger feelings
of distrust among employees, thereby reducing internal moti-
vations to comply with the law." 9 6 Corporate architecture
strategies, however, require firms to collaborate with their em-
ployees to avoid engaging in misconduct, thereby empowering
employees to assist the firm in its compliance efforts.' 9 7 The
government's current enforcement regime promotes, and at
times rewards, aggressive policing, but that appears to come at
192 Hugh Son, JPMorgan Algorithm Knows You're a Rogue Employee Before
You Do, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 8, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/ 2015-04 -08/jpmorgan-algorithm-knows-you-re-a-rogue-employee-
before-you-do [https://perma.cc/C63E-KL5P].
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Baer, supra note 31, at 136.
196 Id.
197 See id. at 134-35.
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the expense of more difficult to craft corporate architecture
strategies.
5. Emphasizing Ethicality
Today's discussions of compliance often take place without
any corresponding emphasis on the importance of promoting
ethicality.1 9 8 Many perceive issues surrounding ethicality to be
separate from issues of compliance, yet research from the fields
of behavioral ethics and behavioral legal ethics suggests that
separating ethics from compliance strategies may in fact be
harmful to the firm.19 9
In part, this is because "aggressive compliance monitoring
can have an unfavorable effect on the motivation of agents to
comply with rules."200 Behavioral ethics literature demon-
strates that when individuals are told to comply with rules for
the sake of compliance instead of for the sake of acting ethi-
cally, it can actually diminish ethical behavior within firms. 2 0 1
Behavioral ethics research also demonstrates that mandating
specific goals can create systematic problems. Specifically,
they can encourage employees to "1. focus too narrowly on
their goals, to the neglect of nongoal areas; 2. engage in risky
behavior; 3. focus on extrinsic motivators and lose their intrin-
sic motivation; 4. and, most importantly ... ,engage in more
unethical behavior than they would otherwise." 2 02
By encouraging a more comprehensive overhaul of firms'
compliance programs, governmental actors may prompt com-
pliance gatekeepers within firms to consider questions of ethics
in addition to questions associated with ensuring effective po-
licing methods within the organization. The Organizational
Guidelines already state that firms should engage in employing
an effective compliance and ethics program, so a return to
considerations of ethicality when considering issues of compli-
ance within firms does not appear to be a dramatic or unprece-
dented action.203 Indeed, it could be a valuable use of time and
energy for an organization attempting to create an organiza-
198 See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Essay, Risky Business, 94 GEO. L.J. 1957, 1973
(2006).
199 Indeed, in Professor Miller's recent overview of the compliance function, he
asserts that "the law of compliance shares an uneasy boundary with a broader set
of issues that might loosely be termed 'ethics beyond compliance."' Miller, Com-
pliance Function, supra note 32, at 18.
200 Regan, supra note 198, at 1970.
201 See MAx H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPoTs 103-07 (2011).
202 Id. at 104.
203 See Miller, Compliance Function, supra note 32, at 12.
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tional culture that discourages misconduct and encourages
ethical conduct.
B. Objections
Despite the many benefits to this Article's proposed frame-
work, there are some potential objections. This section will
outline three. First, whether interagency coordination may ac-
tually produce harmful results for efforts to quell recidivist cor-
porate misconduct. Second, whether it is appropriate to
sanction organizations with complex structures in a uniform
manner. Third, whether the proposal's focus on public compa-
nies is too narrow in scope.
1. Might Interagency Coordination Actually Produce
Harmful Results?
This Article proposes improving the sharing of information
and cooperation of diverse regulatory agencies in an effort to
encourage sanctions for recidivist corporate misconduct.
There are, however, a variety of potential downsides to in-
creased coordination amongst agencies.
First, increased coordination "can make less resilient the
legal safeguards pursuant to which individual agencies carry
out their missions." 2 0 4 For example, if an agency that typically
pursues only civil penalties begins to coordinate with the DOJ,
it may be that an offense that Congress meant to be remedied
in a civil context may result in a company receiving a height-
ened sanction due to a determination that the company is a
recidivist when a subsequent, similar offense is discovered.
Second, if agencies with shared but distinct enforcement space
begin to coordinate in actions brought against corporations, it
may present a unique challenge if judicial review of the coordi-
nated-agency action must be obtained. Courts typically review
administrative action "of a single agency operating in relative
insularity from other administrative actors, exercising formal
legal authority through discrete actions that resemble lawmak-
ing or adjudication." 2 0 5 If courts must instead review coordi-
nated-agency action, it may be difficult to parse which actions
are acceptable for which governmental actors. Third, if govern-
mental actors decide to coordinate on their own accord, "the
resulting arrangements are not only of far lower visibility than
legislative enactments, but they are also prone to self-dealing
204 Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 211, 252-60 (2015).
205 Id. at 268.
1052 [Vol. 102:1003
2017] COORDINATING COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES
by the enforcers" engaged in the coordination effort. 2 0 6 Fourth,
an increased level of coordination between administrative
agencies and the DOJ may allow an agency to refer a case to
the DOJ that the agency does not want to expend resources
pursuing, thereby allowing it to blame the DOJ if it determines
not to go forward with the case. 2 0 7 Fifth, the role of prosecu-
tors, like those found at the DOJ, is typically understood to
"require a certain level of independence to make their decisions
without inappropriate and extraneous political pressures." 2 08
If the DOJ is required to engage in a coordinated effort with
external agencies, it might infringe on the DOJ's independent
assessments and decision making.
The above are just a few of what are many potential con-
cerns when one considers the drawbacks associated with inter-
agency coordination and the sharing of information and
responsibility across distinct regulatory actors. These con-
cerns should not be ignored, but they should also be assessed
in a slightly different way when one considers their application
to an interagency coordination strategy aimed at addressing
recidivist conduct.
The firms subject to this Article's proposal will necessarily
have had multiple encounters with government actors as a
result of corporate misconduct. These encounters would have
been initiated and assessed on an individual basis long before
the type of coordination proposed by this Article would even
begin to be contemplated. As a result, the legitimacy of the
initial enforcement actions would not be subject to the com-
plexities created by interagency coordination. Additionally, the
coordination suggested in this Article consists of an indepen-
dent assessment by a DOJ official, thereby allowing the DOJ to
maintain independence in its exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion. That is not to suggest that challenges or downsides asso-
ciated with interagency coordination would not exist in an
effort aimed at sanctioning repeat corporate offenders in an
effort to increase incentives for firms to improve their compli-
ance programs. It does, however, suggest that the traditional
206 Daniel C. Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between Federal and Local
Law Enforcement, in 2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000, at 81, 102 (Charles M. Friel ed.,
2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/criminaljustice2000/vol_2/02d2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M74F-4PK9) (discussing coordination amongst state and federal en-
forcement authorities).
207 See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prose-
cutors, 103 CoLuM. L. REv. 749, 763-65 (2003).
208 Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the
Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOwA L. REv. 393, 438 (2001).
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concerns regarding interagency coordination may not be as
significant in a regime aimed at coordinating sanctions for re-
cidivist conduct by corporate offenders.
2. Is it Appropriate to Sanction Organizations with
Complex Structures in a Uniform Manner?
Today's corporate organizations are complex. Some firms
have a variety of related entities or subsidiaries. For example,
HSBC, like many public companies, has several subsidiar-
ies. 209 The instances of misconduct outlined in the Introduc-
tion were committed by a variety of HSBC subsidiaries. 2 10
Other organizations are extremely large organizations with rel-
atively siloed departments that function autonomously as
mini-companies. 2 11 Thus, a legitimate question exists as to
whether organizations with complex structures should be
treated as one entity for purposes of a recidivism review. 2 12
Importantly, this Article's proposal is consistent with the
manner in which corporations and the DOJ currently negotiate
settlement agreements. The DOJ treats related corporate enti-
ties as if they are one unit, so it would seem appropriate to
develop a strategy that does the same. 2 13 For example, when
three Hewlett-Packard subsidiaries settled FCPA violations, the
parent company, while not entering into an agreement with
DOJ Fraud, "committed to maintain and continue enhancing
its compliance program and internal accounting controls."2 14
In another example, Alcatel-Lucent agreed to make changes to
its compliance program across all of its related entities. Specif-
ically, the agreement states:
Alcatel-Lucent represents that it has implemented and will
continue to implement a compliance and ethics program de-
signed to prevent and detect violations of the FCPA, the anti-
corruption provisions of French law, and other applicable
209 See Miller, Compliance Function, supra note 32, at 18 (describing how
organizations can benefit from a favorable public image or psychological benefits
for members of the organization).
210 See Simplified Structure Chart, HSBC (Dec. 31, 2016), http://www.
hsbe.com/-/media/hsbc-com/about-hsbc/structure-and-network/pdfs/group-
structure-chart.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K83-9PXH].
211 Coca-Cola stands as a classic example of a multinational enterprise that
silos its various businesses extensively. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F.
Supp. 2d 1345, 1354-55 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
212 A robust analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article and will
be the focus of a future project.
213 See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Hewlett-Pack-
ard Polska, supra note 96.
214 Id. 91 4.
1054 [Vol. 102:1003
2017] COORDINATING COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES
anti-corruption laws throughout its operations, including
those of its affiliates, agents, and joint ventures, and those of
its contractors and subcontractors, with responsibilities that
include interacting with foreign officials or other high risk
activities. 2 15
In yet another example, when Vetco International and four of
its subsidiaries pleaded guilty to FCPA violations, the parent
company agreed to assume all of the obligations "on behalf of
each of its Vetco Gray subsidiaries." 2 1 6 Thus, the DOJ and
corporations appear not to adhere to technical concerns re-
garding the separate legal status of related corporate entities
when entering into settlement agreements. As such, it appears
appropriate to consider repeat misconduct across subsidiaries
when considering whether a corporate entity may be a
recidivist.
Additionally, this Article's proposal does not outline a
broad-based rule; it outlines a standard by which DOJ compli-
ance counsel can make an individualized assessment regard-
ing an organization's compliance program. Nothing in the
proposal prevents DOJ compliance counsel, or individual pros-
ecutors charged with bringing an enforcement action against a
company, from determining whether it appears appropriate to
treat separate instances of misconduct independently. The
proposal outlined leaves a great deal of discretion with prose-
cutors to make the charging decisions they deem appropriate
given the totality of the circumstances before them.
Thus, while concerns regarding the appropriate treatment
of corporations with complex organizational structures are le-
gitimate in this context and would benefit from further re-
search, those considerations are not dispositive to the claims
outlined in this Article.
3. Is a Proposal Aimed at Public Companies Too Narrow?
This Article focuses on misconduct at public companies,
and the proposal outlined in Part III is crafted in a manner
meant to incentivize public companies to overhaul their com-
pliance programs. Yet organizational misconduct is not limited
to public companies. Thus, a legitimate criticism might be
raised regarding the wisdom of putting forth a proposal that is
inherently limited in its ability to deter repeat corporate mis-
215 Deferred Prosecution Agreement T 8, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.,
No. 10-20907 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2010), ECF No. 10 (emphasis added).
216 Plea Agreement T 10, United States v. Vetco Gray UK Ltd., No. CR-H-07-
004 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2007), ECF No. 26.
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conduct because only public companies are required to file
Form 8-Ks, thus only public companies would receive a recidi-
vism review.
Yet the reality is that incentivizing more ethical institu-
tions, which will pursue strategies that may result in effective
compliance programs, requires a multifaceted approach. This
Article's proposals will not and cannot create a perfect set of
incentives to ensure that all organizations establish effective
ethics and compliance programs. However, this Article's pro-
posal, if adopted, will address some of the coordination chal-
lenges that are an inherent part of the current U.S. regulatory
structure and will provide an additional incentive for firms to
implement policies that will address compliance deficiencies on
a wholesale, as opposed to a piecemeal, basis.
C. Unresolved Concerns
There are a variety of open questions raised by this Article's
suggestions and proposal. This Part will discuss two such
questions. First, what factors should the DOJ compliance
counsel consider when determining whether an organization
should be treated as a corporate repeat offender? Second, what
types of misconduct should be considered in a repeat offender
assessment?
1. When Should an Organization Be Treated as a Repeat
Offender?
One question raised by the case study in subpart III.C is
when an organization should be treated as a repeat offender.
The case study identified three categories of repeated miscon-
duct. Category 1 includes multiple offenses with the same or
similar unlawful objectives and behavior. Category 2 includes
multiple offenses with the same or similar unlawful behavior
but dissimilar unlawful objectives. Category 3 includes multi-
ple offenses that do not share any characteristics in terms of
the type of unlawful behavior or unlawful purpose.
This issue might benefit from further research, particularly
as it relates to Category 2, but it seems most important that
companies falling into Category 1 be treated as repeat offend-
ers. The companies outlined in Category 1 appear to have in-
stitutional deficiencies in creating a culture that disavows
bribery as a mechanism for obtaining a competitive business
advantage. When organizational misconduct contains these
types of similarities, it may be appropriate to treat the organi-
zation as a repeat offender. In contrast, the companies out-
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lined in Category 3 do not appear to have entered into
misconduct that looks in any way related. Thus, the miscon-
duct identified looks less likely to reflect some sort of underly-
ing deficiency with the firm's compliance program.
Importantly, this Article is not advocating for a bright-line
rule establishing what does and does not count as recidivist
behavior for corporate offenders. Instead, the Article purpose-
fully leaves a determination of what should count as recidivist
conduct firmly within the discretion of the governmental actor
considering whether the types of corporate misconduct that
have occurred are sufficiently similar to warrant a label of re-
cidivist and a correspondingly heightened sanction.
2. What Legal Areas Should Be Part of a Repeat
Offender Assessment?
There are a multitude of ways that a corporation can vio-
late legal or regulatory requirements. Another legitimate ques-
tion is what types of violations should "count" when
determining whether to treat a corporation as a repeat
offender.
Again, this issue would likely benefit from additional re-
search, but it appears as if organizational misconduct can be
divided into two basic groups. The first includes misconduct
that is traditionally enforced through public means, so through
formal, governmental action (e.g., governmental prosecutions).
The second includes misconduct that is traditionally enforced
through private means (e.g., employment discrimination
lawsuits).
Because this Article is focused on how public enforcement
agents can more effectively incentivize firms to implement ef-
fective ethics and compliance programs, it seems most appro-
priate for the former category to be considered when
determining whether to treat a corporation as a repeat of-
fender. There are likely other proposals for reform that would
be better suited to address repeated instances of misconduct
for firms that have engaged in the latter types of wrongdoing.
CONCLUSION
The government has dedicated a great deal of time, effort,
money, and energy to incentivizing private firms to implement
effective ethics and compliance programs. This Article makes
three contributions to the academic discourse on organiza-
tional compliance efforts. First, the Article, through a case
study, demonstrates that governmental enforcement agents
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are largely ignoring corporate recidivism. Second, the Article
explains that the lack of focus by governmental agents on cor-
porate recidivism appears to be based, at least in part, on inter-
and intra-agency coordination challenges. Third, the Article
argues that efforts to provide incentives aimed at improving
corporate compliance would benefit from mechanisms that
(i) recognize when an institution is engaged in recidivist behav-
ior across diverse regulatory areas and (ii) more aggressively
sanction institutions that are repeat offenders. By employing a
more coordinated enforcement strategy that identifies an insti-
tution that is suffering from a systemic compliance failure and
holds corporations responsible for being repeat offenders
across diverse regulatory areas, federal regulators can en-
courage private firms to implement comprehensive reforms to
their compliance policies and procedures. This could ulti-
mately. lead to improved ethical conduct and more effective
ethics and compliance programs within public companies.
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